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Aka v. Washington Hospital Center:
Why the Debate over Pretext Ended with Hicks
LESLIE M. YERNs*
For several years, there has been a debate in the federal circuit courts over
how an employment discrimination plaintiff survives summary judgment at the
pretext stage. Specifically, courts are split over the type of evidenceplaintiffis can
present at the pretext stage. Is discrediting the defendant's explanation for the
alleged adverse action with circumstantial evidence enough to create a genuine
issue offact that discrimination occurred? Or must a plaintiff present direct
evidence of discrimination to survive summary judgment?
This Case Comment argues that the D.C. Circuit's opinion in Aka v.
Washington Hospital Center demonstrates that, to date, most circuit courts have
failed to recognize that the debate over pretext should have ended with the
Supreme Court's decision in St Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks. This discussion
of Aka will show two things. First, under Hicks, a plaintiff may survive summary
judgment without direct evidence. Second, a careful reading of Hicks reveals
that aplaintiffsurvives summaryjudgment without direct evidence if her proof of
pretext raises an issue of material fact over the defendant's credibility, which
then combines with circumstantial evidence in the prima facie case to permit an
inference of discrimination. Because issues of credibility are for a jury to decide,
in such situations lower courts do not have the discretion to require plaintiffs to
present direct evidence of discrimination. As a result, the Aka analysis offers the
federal courts a long overdue resolution to the debate over how a plaintiff
survives summary judgment at the pretext stage.
I. INTRODUCTION
The time-honored McDonnell Douglas framework1 has come under fire in
the last few years.2 At issue is what kind of evidence can an employment
* This Case Comment is dedicated to my parents-Margaret and Gerald Kems-my
greatest source of inspiration. I would like to thank Professor Martha Chamalis for giving me
the beginning tools to develop this Case Comment. I would also like to thank Rebekah
Kaufman for her insightful comments and encouragement throughout the entire writing
process. Finally, I would like to thank Dominic Jones-whose kindness, patience, and support
made it all possible.
I The Supreme Court established this framework in two decisions over a period of almost
ten years. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); see also Texas Dep't
of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
2 Although the McDonnell Douglas framework was built upon Title VII claims, it also
applies to claims under other anti-discrimination statutes. See Koger v. Reno, 98 F3d 631, 633
(D.C. Cir. 1996) (holding the McDonnell Douglas framework applies to Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA) claims); see also DeLuca v. Winer Indus., Inc., 53 F.3d 793, 797
(7th Cir. 1995) (concluding the McDonnell Douglas framework applies to Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA) cases); Barth v. Gelb, 2 F.3d 1180, 1186 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (holding that
because the Rehabilitation Act is a related statute, the McDonnell Douglas framework also
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discrimination plaintiff present to survive summary judgment Specifically, does
discrediting a defendant's explanation of the adverse action4 with circumstantial
evidence ever create a genuine issue of material fact that discrimination occurred?
Or does a court have the discretion to require a plaintiff to present additional, or
direct, evidence of discrimination to survive summary judgment?5 In what
follows, I will argue that the D.C. Circuit correctly answers these questions in the
recent opinion of Aka v. Washington Hospital Center.6 The D.C. Circuit held that
a plaintiff may survive summary judgment without direct evidence if her7 proof
applies in employment discrimination claims).
3 See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). To prevail on summary judgment, the moving party must
establish that there is no genuine dispute to any material fact and as such the movant is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law. See id. The motion raises the same legal inquiry as a motion for
judgment as a matter of law under FED. R. Civ. P. 50(a). But summary judgment is decided
before trial based upon documentary evidence, where as judgment as a matter of law is decided
at trial based upon evidence submitted. See Lynne C. Hermle, Summary Judgment Motions in
Discrimination Cases: Bringing, Defending and Appealing, in EMPLOYMENT LmGATION 1997,
at 877, 950 n.2 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. 592, 1997) (citing
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986)). Hermle discusses in her article how
summary judgment is becoming "the tool of choice" for defendants. See id. at 895. Because
summary judgment establishes undisputed material facts, defendants view summary judgment
as an opportunity to compel dismissal of some or all of a plaintiffs claim. See id. Moreover, it
is a chance for defendants to avoid the substantial cost of trial and potential damages, which
often outweigh the expense of filing for summary judgment See id. On the other hand, Hermle
notes that plaintiffs are less likely to file summary judgment motions. See id. This difference
can be explained by the distribution of burdens under the McDonnell Douglas framework.
Plaintiffs have the burden of persuading the trier of fact that they are victims of intentional
discrimination. Therefore, because plaintiffs have the duty of establishing genuine disputes over
material facts, they are less likely to argue there is no dispute.
4 As will be explained, to discredit the defendant's explanation is referred to as "proof of
pretext." Pretext is a false reason or motive that an individual proffers to hide the actual or
stronger reason or motive. See BLACK'S LAW DICnTONARY 1187 (6th ed. 1990). Therefore, in
the employment discrimination context, proof of pretext is evidence that the employer's
proffered reason is not the real reason for its adverse action. The inference drawn from this is
that the defendant gave a false reason to cover-up discrimination. See infra text accompanying
notes 35-37; see also infra note 42 (discussing how the D.C. Circuit uses the term "pretext'in
Aka).
5 See infra text accompanying notes 30-43. The McDonnell Douglas framework creates
two opportunities for defendants to prevail on summary judgment. First, if the plaintiff fails to
make a prima facie case. Second, if she fails to satisfy her burden of persuasion after the
defendant rebuts the presumption of discrimination with a nondiscriminatory reason. This is an
important distinction because no court has questioned whether a plaintiff should survive
summary judgment if she cannot even make a prima facie case of discrimination. Thus, the real
issue of debate over the McDonnell Douglas framework is what evidence must a plaintiff
present to satisfy her burden once the defendant rebuts her prima facie case of discrimination.
6 156 F.3d 1284 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en banc).
7he author takes the privilege of using the feminine pronoun to refer to unnamed
individuals. The word choice is a concise altemative to "he/she" and is to be regarded as gender
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of pretext raises an issue of material fact over the defendant's credibility, and then
combines that with the evidence presented in the prima facie case to permit an
inference of discrimination.8 Under the Aka analysis, because issues of credibility
are for a jury to decide, in such situations lower courts do not have the discretion
to require plaintiffs to present direct evidence of discrimination.9
The McDonnell Douglas framework consists of a three-prong test that
distributes the burdens of proof and production between plaintiffs and
defendants.10 The plaintiff has the initial burden of proving a prima facie case of
discrimination, and then the defendant has the burden of producing sufficient
evidence to establish a nondiscriminatory reason for the action. The plaintiff has
the final burden of proving that the defendant's reason is a pretext and the real
reason is discrimination.11 In McDonnell Douglas, the Court provided a number
of examples of circumstantial evidence for plaintiffs to present at the pretext
stage, thereby suggesting that a plaintiff could satisfy her burden of proof by
establishing an inference of discrirination. 12 However, the Supreme Court raised
inclusive.
8 SeeAka, 156 F.3d at 1292.
9 See id at 1299 (concluding that credibility is "an issue that is quintessentially one for the
fact finder").
10 Lower courts apply the McDonnell Douglas framework to expedite the disposition of
an employment discrimination clairm. For further discussion of the framework, see infra notes
19-43 and accompanying text
1 This prong of the McDonnell Douglas framework is generally called the "pretext stage"
and will be referred to as such throughout this Case Comment. See generally Ruth Gana
Okediji, Status Rules: Doctrine as Discrimination in a Post-Hicks Environment, 26 FLA. ST. U.
L. REv. 49, 68 (1998) (arguing that the impact of Hicks is that plaintiffs in race discrimination
cases must prove a causal link exists between race and the adverse employment decision); see
also Alfred W. Blumrosen et al., Downsizing and Employee Rights, 50 RUTGERS L. REv. 943,
943 n.8 (1998) (arguing that the loss of jobs in America through the downsizing process has
resulted in the loss of employees' civil rights); Julie Tang & Honorable Theodore M.
McMillian, Eighth Circuit Employment Discrimination Laws: Hicks and its Impact on
Summary Judgment, 41 ST. LOtUS U. LJ. 519, 522 (1997) (discussing the state of employment
law litigation in the Eighth Circuit during the post-Hicks era); Daniel W. Zappo, A Causal
Nexus Approach to Title VII Disparate Treatment Claims, 50 RUrGERS L. REV. 1067, 176-77
(1998) (suggesting the McDonnell Douglas framework be abolished from employment law
litigation).
12 See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804-05 (1973). The Supreme
Court's holding in McDonald Douglas permitted plaintiffs to take their claims to ajury even if
they lacked direct proof of intentional discrimination. See id. The Court stated that a plaintiff
should have a "full and fair opportunity" to prove the defendant's reasons were false and
thereby permit an inference of discrimination. See id. For example, a plaintiff who is African-
American could present evidence of how she was treated by the employer in the past, how her
African-American co-workers have been treated, or even an employer's general policies that
reflect a different treatment for African-American employees than white employees. See id.
How the employer has treated the plaintiff and other African-American employees could
convince the trier of fact that there was a pattern of discriminatory animus from the employer
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doubts about whether this interpretation was correct when it held in Texas
Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine13 that a plaintiff could satisfy her
burden at the pretext stage by presenting either circumstantial or direct
evidence.14 The problem is that the Supreme Court failed to clarify when a
plaintiff could rely on circumstantial evidence and who made that
determination.15 Did Burdine give plaintiffs the discretion to rely on
circumstantial evidence to prove pretext and make an inference of discrimination
if they do not have direct evidence of the defendant's discriminatory motive? Or
did Burdine give discretion to the lower courts to decide whether a plaintiff was
required to present direct evidence of discrimination to survive summary
judgment at the pretext stage?
Although the Supreme Court had the opportunity to address the issue of how
a plaintiff survives summary judgment again in St. Mary's Honor Center v.
Hicks,16 the Court failed to take full advantage of this opportunity. The Court
settled the debate in part by holding that a plaintiff may combine proof of pretext
with evidence from the prima facie case to make a sufficient showing of
intentional discrimination.17 Thus, Hicks affirmed that under the McDonnell
Douglas framework a plaintiff has the opportunity in the appropriate situation to
satisfy her burden of proof at the pretext stage even if she lacks direct evidence of
the defendant's discriminatory motive. However, the Supreme Court neglected to
clarify which situations are appropriate. Therefore, the same questions that arose
after Burdine remained after Hicks: When can a plaintiff rely upon circumstantial
evidence to satisfy her burden of proof at the pretext stage? Or do lower courts
have the discretion to decide whether a plaintiff can rely on circumstantial
evidence or require her to present direct evidence of discrimination to survive
summary judgment?
The lack of guidance from the Supreme Court regarding how a plaintiff
survives summary judgment at the pretext stage has created a split in the circuit
and thus permit an inference of discrimination.
13 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
14 See id. at 256.
15 There is a great distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence. Direct evidence
of intentional discrimination is proof that the defendant's action was motivated by a
discriminatory animus-i.e., based on race, sex, or religion. For example, a statement about
race in the context of the adverse action would suffice as direct evidence of discrimination. On
the other hand, circumstantial evidence does not show that the employer was motivated by
discrimination per se, but rather shows that the defendant was more likely than not motivated
by discrimination. The Supreme Court noted in McDonnell Douglas that circumstantial
evidence would include how the employer treated the plaintiff in the past or past treatment of
other employees in the same protected class. See discussion supra note 12.
16 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
17 See id at 511 (holding that in such situations, proof of pretext allows courts and the trier
of fact to infer intentional discrimination without requiring additional proof).
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courts. 18 At one extreme, some courts hold that a plaintiff never has to present
additional evidence of discrimination once she proves the defendant's reason is a
pretext. At the other extreme, some courts require that, in addition to proving
pretext, the plaintiff must present additional, or direct, evidence of discrimination.
Finally, in the middle are those courts that hold that in the appropriate situation, a
plaintiff's burden of proof is satisfied if a trier of fact can infer discrimination
from proof of pretext combined with the evidence in the prima facie case.
In this Case Comment, I will argue that the D.C. Circuit's opinion in Aka v.
Washington Hospital Center demonstrates that, to date, most circuit courts have
misinterpreted Hicks and thus have failed to recognize that the debate over pretext
should have ended with that decision. My discussion of Aka will show two things.
First, under Hicks, a plaintiff may survive summary judgment without direct
evidence. Second, a plaintiff survives summary judgment without direct evidence
if her proof of pretext raises an issue of material fact over the defendant's
credibility, which then combines with the evidence presented in the prima facie
case to permit an inference of discrimination. Part II gives the debate over pretext
some context by briefly expanding upon how the McDonnell Douglas framework
was established and then explaining why the debate over the pretext stage
subsequently developed. Part 1 discusses the Supreme Court's decision in Hicks
and then addresses why this decision has widened the split between the circuits
over what role proving pretext and circumstantial evidence plays in satisfying a
plaintiff's burden of proof. In Part IV, I will explain the recent interpretation of
Hicks by the D.C. Circuit, and then argue that this interpretation correctly shows
that the debate over pretext should have ended with Hicks.
In Part V, I will conclude with three reasons why Aka v. Washington Hospital
Center is significant to employment discrimination jurisprudence. First, the D.C.
18 Compare Sheridan v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours, 100 F.3d 1061, 1067, 1072 (3d Cir.
1996) (holding that proof of pretext is always enough for a plaintiff to survive summary
judgment), andRotheimer v. Investment Advisers, Inc., 85 F3d 1328, 1336-37 (8th Cir. 1996)
(finding summary judgment inappropriate where a genuine issue of fact exists over whether the
defendant's explanation was pretextual and a reasonable inference of discrimination can be
drawn), with Hidalgo v. Overseas Condodo Ins. Agencies, Inc., 120 F.3d 328, 335-37 (1st Cir.
1997) (granting the defendant's motion for summary judgment because the plaintiff offered no
evidence of intentional discrimination, even though the court presumed that there was a genuine
issue of material fact that the defendant's proffered reason for the action was pretext); Nidds v.
Schindler Elevator Corp., 113 F.3d 912, 918 (9th Cir. 1996) (same); Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil
Tools, 75 F3d 989, 993 (5th Cir. 1996) (stating that in most instances, employment
discrimination plaintiffs use circumstantial evidence to show pretext because direct evidence is
rare); Fisher v. Vassar College, 114 F.3d 1332, 1335-38 (2d Cir. 1997) (en banc) (same); and
Kline v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 128 F.3d 337 (6th Cir. 1997) (same). See generally
Christopher H. Mills et al., Selected Issues Regarding RIF's: Releases, Discovery, "Smoking
Guns, "and Statistics in Age Discrimination Challenges to Downsizing and Layoffs, in AM.
LAW INST-AM. BAR ASSOC. CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC., at 189, 236-38 (ALI-ABA Course of
Study Materials, Mar. 12, 1998) (discussing the various opinions of the circuit courts that reflect
the split over pretext and noting that each circuit has entered into the debate).
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Circuit's interpretation of Hicks is consistent with the Supreme Court's decision
as a whole, and thus diffuses the extreme positions in the pretext debate that rely
on selected language in Hicks. Second, the D.C. Circuit's conclusion that
plaintiffs can survive summary judgment by combining proof of pretext with
circumstantial evidence in the prima facie case is consistent with a recent
Supreme Court trend that favors an expansion of a plaintiff's opportunity to make
her claim.19 Finally, because it is rare for plaintiffs to have direct evidence of a
defendant's discriminatory motives, permitting plaintiffs to rely on circumstantial
evidence to survive summary judgment increases their chances of having their
claims decided by a jury. Therefore, the D.C. Circuit's interpretation of Hicks is
consistent with the purpose of anti-discrimination statutes to provide employees
an opportunity to hold their employers liable for the discrimination they encounter
in the workplace.
I. McDoNNELL DOUGLAS FRAMEWORK: THE DEBATE BEGINS
Two pivotal Supreme Court decisions shaped the three-prong McDonnell
Douglas framework that courts use to determine the disposition of an
employment discrimination claim.20 In McDonnell Douglas Corporation v.
Green,21 the Court established the three-prong framework. Almost ten years later,
in Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, the Court elaborated on
the distribution of the burdens of proof and production between plaintiffs and
defendants under the McDonnell Douglas framework.22
In what follows, I will briefly explain how the McDonnell Douglas
19 The D.C. Circuit's interpretation of Hicks could be characterized as "pro-plaintiff'
because it enables plaintiffs to survive summary judgment with circumstantial evidence. But
this is not a negative characterization, considering most plaintiffs are not fortunate enough to
have direct evidence of the defendant's discriminatory motive. See United States Postal Serv.
Bd. of Govemors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716 (1983). Thus, under the D.C. Circuit's
interpretation of Hicks, plaintiffs have, an opportunity to get to trial based upon the evidence
they will realistically have available to prove that they were victims of intentional
discrimination. However, the D.C. Circuit's interpretation in Aka is surprising in light of the
criticism Hicks has received from scholars for giving plaintiffs a burden of persuasion too high
to get past summary judgment See generally R. Alexander Acosta & Eric J. Von Vorys,
Bursting Bubbles and Burdens of Proof. Disagreements on the Summary Judgment Standard in
Disparate Treatment Employment Discrimination Cases, 2 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 207, 218
(1998); Kenneth R. Davis, The Stumbling Three-Step, Burden-Shifing Approach in
Employment Discrimination Cases, 61 BROOK L. REV. 703, 722-24 (1995); Deborah C.
Malamud, The Last Minuet: Disparate Treatment After Hicks, 93 MICH. L. REV. 2229, 2308
(1995).
20 See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-03 (1973); see also Texas
Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,254 (1981).
21 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
22 See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256.
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framework was established in these two decisions, and then address why a split in
the circuits over how a plaintiff survives summary judgment grew out of it.23
Specifically, the Court's discussion of a plaintiff's burden at the pretext stage in
Burdine failed to clarify two crucial issues: If a plaintiff does not have direct
evidence, can she rely upon circumstantial evidence to discredit the defendant's
proffered reason and establish an inference of discrimination? Or do courts have
the discretion to require a plaintiff to present direct evidence of discrimination to
survive summary judgment at the pretext stage?24
A. The Prima Facie Case
The issue before the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas was what order
and allocation of proof was required in a private employment discrimination
suit.25 The plaintiff was an African-American mechanic who claimed he was
denied employment because of his race.26 In support of his claim, the plaintiff
presented evidence of his job qualifications and evidence that the mechanic
position remained open after the plaintiff was rejected.27 The district court
dismissed the plaintiff's race discrimination claim,28 and the Eighth Circuit
reversed. 9
23 Several scholars agree that the Supreme Court's decision in Burdine started the debate
in the circuits over how a plaintiff survives summary judgment at the pretext stage. See Stephen
W. Smith, Title VII's National Anthem: Is There a Prima Facie Casefor the Prima Facie Case,
12 LAB. L.L 371, 381-95 (1997) (critiquing the McDonnell Douglas framework, the author
explains why it has generated "unproductive, conflicting, and often quite dubious legal
doctrines'); see also Malamud, supra note 19, at 2317-24 (discussing the elimination of the
McDonnell Douglas framework in favor of an open-ended standard).
24 See, e.g., Davis, supra note 19, at 713 (noting Burdine clarified the defendant's burden
under the McDonnell Douglas framework, but "it muddled what the plaintiff must show at
stage three").
25 See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 800.
26 See id at 796. The plaintiff also claimed that he was denied employment because of his
involvement in the civil Tights movement, which included protesting the defendant's alleged
racially motivated hiring process. See id. at 794. Under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, it
is unlawful for an employer to discrininate against an individual because she opposed an
unlawful employment action. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1994).
2 7 See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 794 -96. The plaintiff's qualifications as a
mechanic were demonstrated by his former employment with the defendant See id. Moreover,
although he was previously laid off, it was due to a general reduction in the work force and not
poor performance. See id. at 794.
2 8 See id. at 797 (citing Green v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 318 F. Supp. 846, 850 (E.D.
Mo. 1970)). The district court dismissed the plaintiff's racial discrimination claim because the
Equal Employment Opportundty Commission (EEOC) failed to find reasonable cause of a Title
VII violation during their investigation. See id. The district court also dismissed the plaintiff's
claim based on his civil rights activities. See id.
29 See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 797-98 (citing Green v. McDonnell Douglas
1999]
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The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court and set forth a framework to
expedite the disposition of employment discrimination claims. 0 The Court held
that the plaintiff carries the initial burden of proof to establish a prima facie case
of discrimination.31 In order to satisfy this burden, the plaintiff must show that (1)
she was a member of a protected class, (2) she was rejected for a position, (3) she
was qualified, and (4) the position remained open.32 After establishing these four
factors, a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case that permits a presumption of
discrimination.
For example, the plaintiff in McDonnell Douglas was African-American, he
applied for a mechanic position that he was trained for, he was rejected for the
position, and the defendant continued to advertise for a mechanic.33 Based upon
the circumstantial evidence showing that the plaintiff is qualified and yet rejected
for the position in question, the Supreme Court held that the trier of fact is
permitted to presume that the defendant was motivated by discrimination.34
This inference of discrimination is predicated upon the presumption that an
adverse action is based upon impennissible factors unless otherwise explained. 5
Thus, if a plaintiff is otherwise qualified for the position in question, and yet
rejected for that position, it is more likely than not that the defendant was
motivated by impermissible factors such as race.36 Therefore, the Supreme Court
held that upon establishing a prima facie case, the plaintiff has presented an
Corp., 463 F.2d 337,352 (8th Cir. 1972)). The Eighth Circuit held that an EEOC determination
of reasonable cause was not a prerequisite to filing a claim in federal court. See id. Although the
Eighth Circuit reversed on the defendant's race discrimination claim, it affirmed the dismissal
of the claim based on the plaintiff's civil rights activities. See id.
30 See id at 798.
31 See id. at 802. By establishing the four factors set forth in McDonnell Douglas, a
plaintiff makes a prima facie case, which permits a presumption of discrimination. See id. at
803; see also Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,254 (1981).
32 See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802-03. The Supreme Court noted that the four
factors create a conceptual fiamework, not a fiamework that is to be rigidly followed. See id. at
802 n.13. Because the facts of each case vary, the Court determined that the McDonnell
Douglas framework must be applied flexibly. See id. For example, even if the position in
question has not been filed, a plaintiff can still establish a prima facie case. For another example
of the flexibility applied to the McDonnell Douglas four factors, see O'Connor v. Consolidated
Coin Caterers Corporation, 517 U.S. 308 (1996). In O'Connor, a 56 year-old plaintiff in an
ADEA case was replaced by a 40 year-old individual. See id. at 308-09. The Supreme Court
held that a plaintiff is not required to prove replacement by a person not in a protected class to
satisfy the fourth factor. See id. at 312.
33 See McDonnellDouglas, 411 U.S. at 796.
34 See id. at 804.
35 See Fumco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978) ("[W]e are willing to
presume [the defendant was motivated by discrimination] because we know from our
experience that more often than not people do not act in a totally arbitrary manner, without any
underlying reasons, especially in a business setting").
36 See id.
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actionable claim under Title VII 7
After the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the defendant has the burden
to rebut the presumption of discrimination.38 The defendant can rebut the
presumption if it articulates a legitimate and nondiscriminatory reason for the
adverse action.39 For example, the defendant in McDonnell Douglas stated that it
rejected the plaintiff because of his participation in unlawful conduct and not
because of his race.40 The Court concluded, without discussion, that this qualified
as a legitimate and nondiscriminatory explanation 4'
Although the defendant rebuts the initial presumption of discrimination, the
inquiry for the trier of fact continues because the plaintiff has a "full and fair
opportunity" to show that the defendant's proffered reason "was in fact pretext"
for discrimination.42 The Court explained that a plaintiff could successfully prove
pretext by presenting circumstantial evidence that shows the defendant's stated
reason is not the real reason. For example, the plaintiff could present evidence of
how the employer treated the plaintiff before the adverse action, how the
defendant treated other employees in the same protected class as the plaintiff, and
evidence of the defendant's general policy on hiring minorities. 43
The Court's examples demonstrate that plaintiffs can rely on circumstantial
evidence to satisfy their burdens of proof both in the prima facie case and at the
pretext stage. For example, to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, a
plaintiff presents evidence of her qualifications and ultimate rejection. At the
pretext stage, a plaintiff could then present circumstantial evidence of how she
and her co-workers were treated by the defendant to persuade the trier of fact that
the defendant's proffered reason for the adverse action was not the real reason. If
the plaintiff rebuts the defendant's proffered reason with such circumstantial
evidence, then no credible explanation remains for the adverse action. Thus,
unless an employer's adverse action is otherwise explained, similar to the prima
facie case, there is a presumption that the action was based upon impermissible
factors. Therefore, under the McDonnell Douglas framework, a plaintiff could
survive summary judgment at the pretext stage by presenting circumstantial
evidence that shows the defendant's proffered reason is a pretext, which
subsequently permits an inference that the real reason is discrimination.
37 See McDonnellDouglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
3 8 See id.
39 See id.
40 See id. at 802-03.
41 See id. ("We need not attempt in the instant case to detail every matter which fairly
could be recognized as a reasonable basis for a refusal to hire").
42 See id. at 804-05. Pretext in this context refers to a showing that the defendant's reason
is false, a lie, or that its real motivation was discriminatory animus. See Aka v. Washington
Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1288 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (discussing the definition of pretext as
used by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas).
43 See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804-05.
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B. Source of the Debate Over the Pretext Stage
Almost ten years after the McDonnell Douglas framework was established,
the Supreme Court significantly elaborated on the three-prong test. In Texas
Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, the primary issue before the Court
was whether after the plaintiff makes her prima facie case the burden of proof
shifts to the defendant to persuade the trier of fact that it was motivated by
nondiscriminatory reasons. 44 But in the process of setting forth the appropriate
standard for a defendant's burden, the Court altered its position on how a plaintiff
satisfies her burden of proof at the pretext stage.
In Burdine, the plaintiff sued the defendant under Title VII for termination
because of her sex.45 After the plaintiff made her prima facie case, the defendant
explained that the plaintiff was not fired because of her sex, but because her
department was inefficient.4 6 The defendant saw as part of the problem an alleged
friction between the plaintiff and her co-workers, and thus fired three
employees-including the plaintiff-to make the department more productive.47
The district court found that the defendant's explanation sufficiently rebutted the
plaintiff s prima facie case and dismissed her claim 4 8 However, the Fifth Circuit
reversed, holding that the defendant's explanation did not satisfy the burden of
persuasion because it did not prove that the men hired were better qualified than
the plaintiff.49
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Fifth Circuit failed to apply the
correct standard for a defendant's burden.50 In McDonnell Douglas, the Court
held that once the plaintiff satisfies her initial burden of establishing a prima facie
case, the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate a nondiscriminatory reason
for the action.51 The Court in Burdine clarified what this burden-shifting entails
44 See Texas Dep't Community Affairs V. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,250 (1981).45 See id. at 251. The plaintiff claimed that after the defendant restructured the workforce,
it terminated several employees while subsequently hiring a male supervisor and retaining a
male employee. See id. During this process, the plaintiff was one of the employees who was
terminated. See id.
In addition to her termination claim, the plaintiff also alleged that the defendant failed to
promote her based on sex. See id. However, the district court dismissed this claim based on
testimony that the plaintiff received a nondiscriminatory performance evaluation. See id. The
Fifth Circuit affirmed that the plaintiff's failure to be promoted was not based on
discrimination, because the evidence showed that the male employee who was promoted was
better qualified. See id.
46 See id
47 See id
48 See id.
49 See id. at 251-52.
50 See id. at 252 (remanding the case for an "application of the correct standard").
51 See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (holding that once
the plaintiffmakes a prima facie case, "[t]he burden then must shift to the employer to articulate
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by stating that the defendant only has the burden of production. 52 That is, the
defendant need only present enough evidence that sufficiently articulates a
legitimate and nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action.53 Therefore, the
Court concluded that when the defendant puts forth an explanation, it need not
persuade the trier of fact that the proffered reason truly motivated the defendant to
act.
54
The Court explained that the defendant only has the burden of production
because the plaintiff retains the burden of persuasion at all times under the
McDonnell Douglas framework. 55 In an employment discrimination case, the
ultimate question for the trier of fact is whether the plaintiff is a victim of
intentional discrimination. The three-prong framework places the burden of
proving discrimination on the plaintiff- if the defendant rebuts the initial
presumption of discrimination, then the plaintiff has the opportunity to prove that
the defendant's reasons were a pretext for discrimination.5 6 Otherwise, if the
defendant were required to persuade the trier of fact that the proffered reasons
were true, it would be placing upon the defendant the plaintiff's ultimate burden
of proving she was a victim of discrimination by requiring the defendant to prove
the plaintiffmakes a prima facie case, "[t]he burden then must shift to the employer to articulate
some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection").
52 See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254-55 (holding that "[t]he burden that shifts to the
defendant... is to rebut the presumption of discrimination by producing evidence that the
plaintiff was rejected, or someone else was preferred, for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason").
53 See id.; see also Davis, supra note 19, at 713. Davis noted that the Burdine decision
could be criticized for placing only a small burden on the defendant while placing the lofty
burden of persuasion solely on the plaintiff. See id. But as Davis points out, the Supreme Court
addressed this criticism by holding that the legitimate reason must be clear and specific. See id.
(citing Burdine, 450 U.S. at 258). Moreover, even without the burden of persuasion, the
defendant will want to persuade the trier of fact as a tactical matter that the explanation is bona
fide. See id.
54 See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254 (holding that the burden of persuading the trier of fact that
the defendant acted out of intentional discrimination remains with the plaintiff) (citing Bd. of
Trustees of Keene State College v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24,25 n.2 (1978)).
55 See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253.
56 See id. ("[S]hould the defendant carry this burden, the plaintiff must then have the
opportunity to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by
the defendant were not its true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination.") (citing
McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804); see also Davis, supra note 19, at 713 (discussing how
the plaintiff proves pretext once the defendant proffers a nondiscriminatory reason for the
adverse action).
The result of distributing the burdens between the plaintiff and defendant was that the
McDonald Douglas framework defined two situations in which the defendant could prevail on
summary judgment The first occurs when the plaintiff fails to establish her prima facie case of
discrimination. Alternatively, the defendant is entitled to summary judgment if the plaintiff does
not show that the defendant's proffered reason for the adverse action was a pretext for
discrimination. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 252-53.
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she was not discriminated against.57 Therefore, the Supreme Court concluded that
under the McDonnell Douglas framework, the burden placed upon the defendant
is only the burden of production.58
The Supreme Court's discussion of the plaintiff's ultimate burden of
persuasion significantly altered how a plaintiff satisfies her burden of proof at the
pretext stage. The Court in McDonnell Douglas held that after the defendant
proffers an explanation, the plaintiff has the opportunity to show that the
defendant's proffered reasons "were in fact a cover-up" for discrimination.59
Moreover, the Court demonstrated how a plaintiff could satisfy her burden with
circumstantial evidence, thereby suggesting that a plaintiff without direct
evidence could satisfy her burden by presenting sufficient circumstantial evidence
to permit an inference of discrimination. 60 However, in Burdine, the Court stated
that the plaintiff's burden of proving pretext merges with her ultimate burden of
persuading the trier of fact that she was a victim of intentional discrimination.61
By discussing proof of pretext and proof of discrimination as separate burdens
that merge together at the pretext stage, the Court suggested that a plaintiff must
perform two definitive duties to satisfy her burden of persuasion. That is, she
must show that the defendant's proffered reason was false and that discrimination
was the real reason for the adverse action.62
57 In essence, the Burdine Court narrowed the focus of employment discrimination
litigation to what the defendant shows. Once a defendant rebuts the presumption of
discrimination, the Court held that the factual issues in the case are clarified to give the plaintiff
the opportunity to prove pretext. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256. But clarification in this context
means that the plaintiff's prima facie case has no more weight, and she must persuade the trier
of fact that she was the victim of intentional discrimination with new evidence. However,
Burdine left open the possibility that the plaintiff's burden of persuasion could be satisfied with
either direct evidence of discrimination or with circumstantial evidence that shows the
defendant's explanation was pretextual. See id. Thereby, a showing of pretext would permit an
inference of discrimination. The Supreme Court later affirmed this narrowed focus when it
stated that after a defendant sets forth an explanation, the presumption of discrimination
"simply drops out of the picture." St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 510-11
(1993). For further discussion, see infra text accompanying notes 83-86.5 8 See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254-56. As the Supreme Court explained, if a defendant is
successful in rebutting the presumption of discrimination from the prima facie case, the burden
of proof remains on the plaintiff to establish intentional discrimination. See id. at 255 n.10. But
if the defendant's rebuttal is unsuccessful, it results in a judgment for the plaintiff. See id. at
254. Therefore, although plaintiffs have the ultimate burden ofpersuasion, the assumption from
the Court is that defendants will voluntarily attempt to persuade the trier of fact that they did not
intentionally discriminate against the plaintiffs.
5 9 See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 805.
60 See supra text accompanying notes 42-43.
61 See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256.
62 See id Under this interpretation, the plaintiff's burden of proof at the pretext stage could
be referred to as a "double duty." That is, in order to satisfy her burden of proof at the pretext
stage, the plaintiff has two duties to perform: she must show that the defendant's proffered
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However, what the Burdine Court failed to make clear is the kind of evidence
a plaintiff can use to satisfy this dual burden. The Court suggested that a plaintiff
could still satisfy her burden of proof at the pretext stage with circumstantial
evidence, stating that the plaintiff could present "indirect evidence"which
discredits the defendant's explanation and then citing the McDonnell Douglas
examples for support.63 However, the Court also stated that a plaintiff could
present direct evidence of a defendant's discriminatory motive to satisfy her
burden of persuasion.64 Thus, perhaps the real problem with Burdine is that the
Court failed to resolve ultimately who made the decision. Specifically, did
plaintiffs without direct evidence maintain the discretion to present sufficient
circumstantial evidence to discredit the defendant's reason and permit an
inference of discrimination? Or did courts have the discretion to require that, in
addition to proving pretext, a plaintiff must also present direct evidence of a
discriminatory motive to satisfy her burden of persuasion?
The Supreme Court simply failed to address these questions in Burdine.
Thus, by default, it left the discretion to the lower courts to decide whether a
plaintiff is permitted to rely on circumstantial evidence or is required to present
direct evidence of discrimination at the pretext stage. Therefore, in the post-
Burdine era, plaintiffs could not be assured that they would survive summary
judgment without direct evidence since the kind of evidence permitted, or
required, depended on which court was reviewing their case.
C. The Post-Burdine Debate over the Pretext Stage
The Supreme Court's silence in Burdine over who decides the kind of
evidence a plaintiff can present to satisfy her burden of proof at the pretext stage
created a split in the circuit courts. At issue is how a plaintiff can survive
summary judgment at the pretext stage. Is she permitted to present circumstantial
evidence to satisfy her burden of proof? Or can a court require her to present
direct evidence of discrimination? As I will address in this section, three
approaches to the pretext stage emerged: "pretext-plus," "pretext-always," and
"permissive pretext"
reason is false and prove that the real reason is discrimination. Thus, only if a plaintiff satisfies
her double duty will she survive summary judgment at the pretext stage.
63 See id at 256 (stating the plaintiff could succeed at the pretext stage by
"indirectly... showing that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence")
(citing McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804-05).
64 See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256 (stating that the plaintiff could also succeed at the pretext
stage by "directly... persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated
the employee).
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1. "Pretext-Plus"
Some courts interpreted Burdine as requiring the plaintiff to prove two
separate burdens to survive summary judgment.65 A plaintiff must show that the
defendant's proffered reason is not the true reason.66 However, this burden
merges with the ultimate burden of proving directly that she was the victim of
intentional discrimination.67 Thus, a plaintiff must discredit the defendant's
explanation and then present direct evidence of discrimination to prove that the
defendant was motivated by discriminatory animus. This is a "pretext-plus"
position: to survive sunmaryjudgment; a plaintiffimust prove pretext plus present
additional, or direct evidence to prove that the real reason was discrimination. 8
2. "Pretext-Always"
Other courts interpreted Burdine as giving plaintiffs two options to prove that
the defendant's reason is false and that the real reason is discrimination. A
plaintiff can present direct evidence of the defendant's discriminatory motive,
which will simultaneously show that the proffered reason is false and that
discrimination is the real reason.69 Alternatively, a plaintiff can present indirect
evidence that persuades the trier of fact to disbelieve the defendant's explanation
65 See Davis, supra note 19, at 714 & n.58 (discussing the pretext-plus approach and
noting the circuit courts that followed this position); see, e.g., Smith, supra note 23, at 391-92
(noting that Burdine became a source of confusion in the circuit courts, causing some to define
"pretext" as "pretext for discrimination" and therefore requiring a plaintiff to show more than
that the defendant was lying, but proving intentional discrimination); D. Don Welch, Removing
Discriminatory Barriers: Basing Disparate Treatment Analysis on Motive Rather Than Intent,
60 S. CAL. L. REv. 733, 759-62 (1987) (explaining why the "pretext-plus" position is not
constitutionally mandated).
66 See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256 (stating the plaintiff "now must have the opportunity to
demonstrate that the proffered reason was not the true reason for the employment decision').
67 See id. (holding that the burden of proving pretext "now merges with the ultimate
burden of persuading the court that she has been the victim of intentional discrimination' ).
68 See, e.g., EEOC v. Flasher Co., 986 F2d 1312, 1321 (10th Cir. 1992) (holding a finding
of pretext does not compel a finding of discrimination); Galbraith v. Northern Telecorn, Inc.,
944 F.2d 275, 283 (6th Cir. 1991) ("[P]roving that an employer's proffered reason for
discharging an employee is a pretext does not establish that it is a pretext for racial
discrimination."); Lopez v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 930 F.2d 157, 161 (2d Cir. 1991)
(holding a plaintiff must show that the defendant's explanation was false to satisfy her burden
of proof at the pretext stage); Holder v. City of Raleigh, 867 F.2d 823, 827 (4th Cir. 1989)
(noting a finding that the defendant's reasons were pretextual does not prove racial
discrimination); Clark v. Huntsville Bd. of Educ., 717 F.2d 525, 529 (1lth Cir. 1983)
(explaining that even if a plaintiff shows the defendant's explanation was pretextual, there must
be a finding that the defendant was motivated by discrimination).
69 See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256.
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and permit an inference of discrimination.70 Thus, if a plaintiff chooses the
second option, after proving pretext she need not present any additional evidence
of discrimination. This is a "pretext-always" position: once a plaintiff persuades
the trier of fact that the defendant's explanation is false, she has satisfied her
burden of proof.71 The assumption is that circumstantial evidence of pretext is
enough to create an inference of discrimination at the pretext stage.72 Therefore,
by proving that the defendant's explanation is "unworthy of credence," the
plaintiff shows both that the defendant's reason is false and that discrimination is
the real reason.
3. "Permissive Pretext"
In between "pretext-plus" and "pretext-always" were those courts that
interpreted Burdine as granting lower courts the discretion to decide whether a
plaintiff could satisfy her burden at the pretext stage with just circumstantial
evidence of pretext. 3 At the pretext stage, a plaintiff's burden of showing the
defendant's explanation is unbelievable merges with her burden of proving she
was a victim of intentional discrimination. 4 Under Burdine, a plaintiff can prove
this either with direct evidence of a discriminatory motive or with circumstantial
evidence of pretext 75 If a plaintiff proves pretext with circumstantial evidence, it
is the lower court's decision to permit an inference of discrimination or require
additional evidence of discrimination. This is a "permissive pretext" position:
once a plaintiff shows that the defendant's proffered reason is pretextual, the trier
of fact may, but is not compelled to, find that the plaintiff has satisfied her burden
of persuasion. 6
70 See id. (stating that instead of satisfying her burden with direct evidence, a plaintiff
could "indirectly... show[] that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of
credence!).
7 1 See, e.g., Caban-Wheeler v. Elsea, 904 F.2d 1549, 1554 (lth Cir. 1990) (citing
Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256); Tye v. Bd. of Educ., 811 F.2d 315, 319 (6th Cir. 1987) (citing
Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256); King v. Palmer, 778 F.2d 878, 879 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Thombrough v.
Columbus & Greenville R.R., 760 F.2d 633, 646 (5th Cir. 1985); Bibbs v. Block, 778 F.2d
1318, 1321 (8th Cir. 1985); Dufly v. Wheeling Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 738 F.2d 1393, 1396 (3d
Cir. 1984).
72 See Davis, supra note 19, at 716. Calling the pretext always approach "pretext only,"
Davis explains the approach and cites those circuits that followed it See id See also Robert
Brookins, Hicks, Lies, and Ideology: The Wages of Sin is Now Exculpation, 28 CREIGHTON L.
REv. 939,989 (1995).
7 3 See generally Robert C. Cadle, Burdens of Proof. Presumption and Pretext in
Disparate Treatment Employment Discrimination Cases, 78 MAss. L. REV. 122, 131 (1993);
Richard A. Samp, Intent Is Neededfor Worplace Bias, NAT'LLJ., June 14, 1993, at 15.
74 See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256.
75 See ia
76 See, e.g., Samuels v. Raytheon Corp., 934 F.2d 388, 392 (1st Cir. 1991); Benzies v.
Illinois Dep't of Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities, 810 F.2d 146, 148 (7th Cir.
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III. ST. MARY'S HoNoR CENTER v. HicKS: THE SPLIT IN THE CIRCUITS
WIDENS
In the section that follows, I will argue that the Supreme Court in St. Mary's
Honor Center v. Hicks failed in part to resolve the post-Burdine split in the
circuits77 over how a plaintiff survives summary judgment at the pretext stage.
The Supreme Court partially resolved the split by holding that, in certain
situations, a plaintiff can survive summary judgment without direct evidence, by
combining proof of pretext with the circumstantial evidence presented in the
prima facie case.78 However, the Supreme Court did not fully resolve the split
because it failed to define when such a situation exists. Thus, similar to the post-
Burdine era, the lower courts after Hicks have the discretion to permit
circumstantial evidence or require the plaintiff to present direct evidence of
discrimination to satisfy her burden of proof at the pretext stage. As a result,
although the Court had the opportunity to resolve the split,79 Hicks left the door
open for more debate over how a plaintiff survives summary judgment at the
pretext stage.
A- History offHicks
In a claim of race discrimination under Title VIl, the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Missouri entered judgment against the plaintiff
Melvin Hicks.80 Although the court conceded that Hicks had shown the
defendant's explanation was false, it held that he did not prove that the
defendant's actions were racially motivated.81 The Eighth Circuit reversed and
1987).
77 See supra text accompanying notes 65-76. Burdine's conclusion, that a plaintiff could
present either direct or indirect evidence to satisfy her burden of persuasion at the pretext stage,
left several questions unanswered. Did a plaintiff or a court have the discretion to decide
whether a plaintiff could rely on circumstantial evidence to satisfy her burden of proof?. Is proof
of pretext enough to persuade the trier of fact that the defendant was motivated by
discrimination? See supra text accompanying notes 69-72 (discussing the "pretext-always"
position). Or were plaintiffs required to present direct evidence of discrimination, in addition to
proof of pretext, to satisfy their burdens of persuasion at the pretext stage? See supra text
accompanying notes 65-68 (discussing the "pretext-plus" position).
78 See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502,511 (1993).
79 See id at 512 (stating the circuit courts' "divergent views concerning the nature of the
[McDonnell Douglas fiamework] are precisely what prompted us to take this case.'); see, e-g.,
Fumco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567,577 (1978) (stating that the McDonnell Douglas
framework is a "sensible, orderly way to evaluate the evidence," which gives both defendants
and plaintiffs the opportunities to litigate the employment discrimination claim).
80 See Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 756 F. Supp. 1244, 1252 (E.D. Mo. 1991).
81 See id. at 1252 (holding that although the petitioner had "proven the existence of a
crusade to terminate him, he [had] not proven that the crusade was racially rather than
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remanded on the grounds that once a plaintiff proves that the defendant's
proffered reason is pretextual, no additional proof is required and the plaintiff is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.82
The Supreme Court reversed and criticized the Eighth Circuit for ignoring the
plaintiff's continuous burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant was
motivated by discriminatory aninus.83 The Supreme Court was concerned that if
a plaintiff only had to show that the defendant's explanation was pretextual, a
defendant could be held liable under Title VII without proof of intentional
discrimination.84 Proof that the defendant lied is not equal to proof that the
personally motivated").
82 See Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 970 F.2d 487, 492 (8th Cir. 1992) (stating that
"[b]ecause all of defendants' proffered reasons were discredited ... defendants were in no
better position than if they had remained silent").
83 See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 511. The Court reminded the lower court that the McDonnell
Douglas framework only shifts the burden of production to the defendant. See id. Once the
defendant fulfills this burden by giving a legitimate explanation, the presumption of
discrimination drops from the case and the plaintiff maintains the burden of persuading the trier
of fact that she is a victim of discrimination. See id. at 510-11. Therefore, the Court rejected the
Eighth Circuit's holding that proof of pretext compels judgment for plaintiffs because it ignores
the plaintiff's "ultimate burden of persuasion" under Title VII. See id. at 511. But see sources
cited supra note 19 (criticizing the Court's decision in Hicks).
84 See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 511-15. The Supreme Court explained that proof of pretext
merely showed that the defendant lied or was unbelievable when it proffered its
nondiscriminatory reason. See id. at 514. Moreover, the Court stated it has no authority to
impose liability upon the defendant for discriminatory practices unless it is proven the
defendant did in fact intentionally discriminate against the plaintiff. See id. Thus, to prevail in
judgment, a plaintiffmust present evidence that will lead to a finding of discrimination.
Another important issue in Hicks is the type of explanation a defendant can offer to rebut a
presumption of discrimination. In Hicks, the district court granted summary judgment in favor
of the defendant. See Hicks, 756 F. Supp. at 1253. It held that although the plaintiff had shown
the defendant's proffered reason was pretextual, he failed to show it was a pretext for
discrimination as opposed to personal animus. See id. at 1252. However, personal animus was
not the explanation proffered by the defendant. Rather, the district court based its decision on
facts in the record that could support an explanation like personal animus. The Eighth Circuit
reversed the district court's decision because it held proof of pretext entitles a plaintiff to
judgment as a matter of law. See Hicks, 970 F.2d at 492. The Court reasoned that when a
defendant's explanation is discredited, it is in the same position it would have been in if it had
never offered a legitimate reason to rebut the inference of discrimination. See id.
The Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Circuit's decision and recognized personal animus
as a legitimate and nondiscriminatory reason for a defendant's actions. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at
520-24. More importantly, the Court recognized the trial court's duty to look beyond the
explanation proffered by the defendant to see if a nondiscriminatory reason exists in the record.
See id. The Court asserted that regardless of the reason the defendant chooses to "articulate" as
its explanation, other legitimate reasons have been articulated in the record "through the
introduction of adnissible evidence." Id. at 522-23 (citing Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255). Because
the defendant sets forth reasons "through the introduction of admissible evidence," then several
legitimate reasons could be found "lurking in the record." Id. Thus, a plaintiff need not address
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defendant discriminated against the plaintiff.85 Thus, the Court held in Hicks that
a plaintiff must show additional evidence of discrimination to ultimately
prevail.86
Although a plaintiff could not prevail by proving pretext the Supreme Court
did not reject the use of pretext to help a plaintiff survive summary judgment. It
stated that "[t]he fact finder's disbelief of the reasons put forward by the
defendant (particularly if disbelief is accompanied by a suspicion of mendacity)
may, together with the elements of the prima facie case, suffice to show
intentional discrimination." 87 The prima facie case is built upon circumstantial
evidence showing the plaintiff to be qualified and yet rejected for the position.88
This establishes an inference of discrimination based on the presumption that
without an explanation to the contrary, the defendant was motivated by
impernissible factors.89 Thus, the language in Hicks suggests that the same logic
from the prima facie case can be applied at the pretext stage. To satisfy her burden
of proof, the plaintiff must show that the defendant's proffered reason is false and
discrimination is the real reason. If the plaintiff discredits the defendant's reason,
it rebuts the explanation, and evidence presented in the prima facie case is the
only credible evidence in the record. Therefore, under Hicks, a plaintiff can
combine proof of pretext with the circumstantial evidence in the record to
establish an inference of discrimination that will satisfy the plaintiffis burden of
proof at the pretext stage.
The Court's conclusion that proof of pretext can help establish an inference
of discrimination gives proof of pretext considerable evidentiary weight in certain
any unrelated reasons for the defendant's actions, but only address those reasons "lurking in the
record." Id
The Court also rejected the Eighth Circuit's conclusion that proof of pretext puts
defendants in no better position than if it had given no reason at all. See id. at 509. The Court
stated that by meeting its burden of production, the defendant is in a better position than before
its rebuttal. See id. Moreover, the Court noted that when a defendant meets its burden of
production and thereby rebuts a presumption of discrimination, it "precedes the credibility
assessment stage." Id. Thus, when the trier of fact looks to the defendant and the evidence in the
record for a nondiscriminatory reason, the trier of fact is not assessing the defendant's
credibility. Rather, the trier of fact merely determines whether the articulated reasons are
legitimate and leaves an assessment of the defendant's credibility for later. See id. at 509-10.
85 See id. at 511-15.
86 See id. at 518-20. This is not a surprising conclusion. Remember that at the pretext
stage, the plaintiff is attempting to satisfy her burden of proof to get to trial. At this point, she
has only made a presumption of discrimination. If a defendant proffers a nondiscriminatory
reason, that presumption drops. Thus, at the pretext stage, the plaintiff must make at least an
equal showing of discrimination that was made in the prima facie case. By only proving pretext,
the plaintiff has shown that the defendant lied, but not whether he lied to cover-up
discrimination or simply personal dislike.
87 Id. at 511.
88 See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,802 (1973).
89 See id.
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situationsP0 For example, a defendant explains that the plaintiff was fired because
she did not get along with customers, and her supervisor received complaints
about her performance. The plaintiff presents evidence of customer praise, strong
performance evaluations, and testifies that she has never seen or heard of any
negative comments.9 1 This evidence persuades the trier of fact that the
defendant's explanation is unbelievable and thus rebuts the defendant's
nondiscriminatory reasons.92 Once the reasons are rebutted, the only other
credible evidence before the trier of fact is from the prima facie case, which
shows the plaintiff to be qualified and yet terminated from her position. Because
we generally believe employers make decisions for a reason, 93 without evidence
to the contrary, the trier of fact is permitted to draw an inference that the
defendant was motivated by discriminatory factors.94
However, Hicks does not foreclose the use of direct evidence to satisfy the
plaintiff's burden of persuasion. On the contrary, the word "may" in the decision
suggests that a plaintiff cannot always satisfy her burden at the pretext stage by
combining proof of pretext and evidence from the prima facie case.95 For
example, the plaintiff could present evidence showing that the real reason for the
defendant's action was personal animus towards the plaintiff. Although this
shows the defendant's reason was a pretext, it does not combine with the
90 The Court noted that the Eighth Circuit was correct to find that once an inference of
discrimination was made, no additional proof was required. See id. But the Supreme Court
instructed the lower court that this inference could only be used to survive summary judgment
at the pretext stage. See id Moreover, the inference is only permitted if it is made from both
evidence in the prima facie case and evidence discrediting the defendant's explanation. See id.
This supports the Court's conclusion that proof of pretext has evidentiary weight when the
plaintiff uses circumstantial evidence to survive the pretext stage, but it has no weight in
winning a plaintiff final judgment on her intentional discrimination claim before trial. See St.
Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 518-19 (noting a finding of intentional
discrimination is not equal to finding the defendant's explanation untrue).
91 See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804-05; see also Texas Dep't of Community
Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,256 (1981).
92 Here the situation would be reversed. If a plaintiff were relying on circumstantial
evidence-evidence used to make her prima facie case-then proof of pretext would need to be
strong enough to sustain that original finding of discrimination. For example, once a defendant
rebuts the presumption of discrimination with a nondiscriminatory reason, the prima facie case
is dropped. If the plaintiff is to succeed in surviving the pretext stage by relying on evidence
from that prima facie case, proof of pretext must be strong enough to sustain that original
finding. In this context, proof of pretext does more than support a finding of discrimination; it is
crucial to making such a finding.
93 See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text
94 For a discussion of why the trier of fact is permitted to make an inference of
discrimination, see supra notes 30-36 and accompanying text.
95 Theword "may" also affirms the Court's decision in Burdine that a plaintiff can rely on
direct evidence of the defendant's discriminatory motive to persuade the trier of fact that the
plaintiff is a victim of intentional discrimination. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256.
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evidence in the prima facie case to permit an inference that the defendant's
proffered reason was a "cover-up" for discrimination.96 Thus, in this situation the
plaintiff would need to present additional, or direct, evidence of discrimination to
satisfy her burden of proof and survive summary judgment.97
The Hicks decision has two significant effects on employment discrimination
jurisprudence. First, the Court ensures that a plaintiff does not survive the pretext
stage without proving that the defendant was motivated by discrimination. 98 If a
plaintiff presents circumstantial evidence, she must show that the defendant's
explanation is unbelievable and then adequately combine this proof of pretext
with evidence from the prima facie case to create an inference of discrimination. 99
Alternatively, if the plaintiff presents direct evidence of the defendant's
discriminatory motive, this alone will show that the defendant's explanation was
false and that the real reason was discrimination.
The second effect is that Hicks ensures plaintiffs a more "full and fair
opportunity"'100 to satisfy their burden of proof at the pretext stage. It is rare for
employment discrimination plaintiffs to have direct evidence of a defendant's
discriminatory motive.101 Thus, if a plaintiff were required to present direct
evidence to satisfy her burden of proof at the pretext stage, a majority of plaintiffs
would not survive summary judgment Therefore, by holding that in certain
situations plaintiffs may rely on circumstantial evidence to persuade the trier of
fact that they were more than likely the victims of intentional discrimination, the
Supreme Court ensured plaintiffs a better chance of having their claims decided
by ajury.10 2
96 See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 805 (stating plaintiffs must have the
opportunity to demonstrate "by competent evidence" that the defendant's proffered reasons
"were in fact a cover-up for" discrimination).
97 It would be difficult for a court not to find an employer's discriminatory statements
about a plaintiff an indication that the employer's real reason for not hiring the plaintiff was a
discriminatory motive. Therefore, direct evidence will often stand alone to persuade the trier of
fact that the plaintiff was a victim of intentional discrimination. In this context, proof of pretext
would help support the finding of discrimination, but it would not be crucial to make such a
finding. See Fumco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567,577 (1978).
98 See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511 (1992) (explaining that rejection
of the proffered reasons of the defendant does not compel judgment for the plaintiff).
9 9 See id at 517.100 See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 805 (stating the plaintiff must have "a full and
fair opportunity to demonstrate by competent evidence that the presumptively valid reasons for
[her] rejection were in fact a cover-up for a... discriminatory decision").
101 See United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716-17
(1983) (noting that direct evidence in employment discrimination cases is rare because "[t]here
will seldom be 'eyewitness' testimony as to the employer's mental processes'); see also
Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil Tools, 75 F.3d 989, 993 (5th Cir. 1996) (explaining that direct
evidence is rare in a discrimination case).
102 Under the 1991 Civil Rights Act, employment discrimination plaintiffs received the
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1. Confusion from Hicks
Although the Supreme Court held that plaintiffs could satisfy their burdens of
proof with circumstantial evidence, the Court failed to define when it was
appropriate for a plaintiff to do so. The only guidance from the Court was that a
rejection of the defendant's explanation can "sustain a finding of discrimination,"
but "there [still] must be a finding of discrimination." 103 This statement is not
surprising considering the Court's concern104 that a defendant not be held liable
unless it is determined that the defendant unlawfully discriminated against the
plaintiff.'1 5 Thus, it seems only to reiterate that a plaintiff's burden at the pretext
stage is two-fold: show that the defendant's reason is false and show that
discrimination was the real reason.
But the Court's statement does not define when it is appropriate for plaintiffs
to rely on an inference of discrimination and thus only raises more questions in
the debate over how a plaintiff survives summary judgment at the pretext stage.
For example, what qualifies as a "finding of discrimination" in the context of
satisfying a plaintiff's burden of proof? A "finding" generally refers to a
determination of fact based upon the evidence presented.106 This could suggest
that, in terms of satisfying the plaintiff's burden of proof, it is more appropriate
for the trier of fact to make a finding of discrimination based upon direct evidence
of discrimination. 107 However, Hicks also states that proof of pretext combined
with evidence in the prima facie case may be sufficient to show intentional
discrimination. 108 The prima facie case establishes an inference of discrimination
right to a jury trial. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(cXl) (1994). The purpose of the 1991 Act was to
ensure that the Supreme Court followed Congress's lead and provided individuals "appropriate
remedies" for discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981(c).
103 Hicks, 509 U.S. at 512 n.4.
104 See id at 514-25. The Supreme Court explained its reluctance to find a defendant
employed discriminatory practices without evidence of discrimination. See id. It stated that
showing a defendant's explanation is false is different from showing that the defendant was
motivated by discrimination. See id. Therefore, although circumstantial evidence may permit an
inference of discrimination, the evidence must not only show that the defendant was
unbelievable, but also that discrimination was the real reason for the adverse action. See id.
105 See id.
106 See BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY 632 (6th ed. 1990).
10 7 But the Supreme Court stated proof of pretext "sustain[s] a finding of discrimination.'
Hicks, 509 U.S. at 511 n.4. Thus the logic of this interpretation immediately brings one question
to mind: "sustain" a finding from what? If a plaintiff has direct evidence of discrimination, then
the plaintiff certainly has satisfied her burden of persuasion, and the case goes to a jury to
decide. Therefore, if a plaintiff has additional evidence outside of her prima facie case, then
proof of pretext is not necessary.
10 8 See iaL at 511 ('The factfinder's disbelief of the reasons put forward by the
defendant... may, together with the elements of the prima facie case, suffice to show
intentional discrimination.").
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based upon evidence of the plaintiff's qualifications and rejection.'0 9 Thus, in the
context of needing a "finding of discrimination" to satisfy the plaintiff's burden of
proof at the pretext stage, an inference of discrimination also appears to qualify as
a "finding" under Hicks.
Although an inference of discrimination may be an appropriate finding to
satisfy a plaintiff's burden of proof, the Hicks decision still leads to another
important question: who decides when this inference is appropriate? Specifically,
if a plaintiff does not have direct evidence, does Hicks automatically permit her to
rely on circumstantial evidence if it establishes a strong inference of
discrimination? Or does a court have the discretion to decide when a plaintiff can
rely on circumstantial evidence and when she is required to present direct
evidence of discrimination?
One would assume that a lower court is precluded from presumptively
requiring a plaintiff to present direct evidence because Hicks states that a plaintiff
can combine proof of pretext with the prima facie case to show intentional
discrimination.1 0 But without more from the Court than simply stating that there
needs to be a "finding of discrimination," lower courts can decide at their own
discretion when an inference of discrimination is and is not an appropriate finding
to satisfy the plaintiff's burden at the pretext stage. 11 Thus, although Hicks gave
plaintiffs the opportunity to survive summary judgment without direct evidence,
the Supreme Court failed to ensure that the circuit courts would consistently
provide that opportunity. As such, Hicks left the door open for more debate over
how a plaintiff survives summary at the pretext stage.
IV. AKA V. WASHINGTONHOSPiTAL CENTER NTERPRETS HIcKS
The D.C. Circuit is the latest court to address the debate over how a plaintiff
survives summary judgment in the post-Hicks era. In what follows, I will argue
that in Aka v. Washington Hospital Center, the D.C. Circuit correctly interpreted
109 See supra notes 30-36 and accompanying text.
110 See id
I11 For example, consider again the scenario in which the defendant explains that the
plaintiff was terminated due to poor performance, and the plaintiff rebuts the explanation with
evidence of customer praise and good performance review. Presumably, under Hicks, the
plaintiff will satisfy her burden of proof at the pretext stage if her evidence shows that the
defendant's reason is unbelievable and rebuts the defendant's legitimate explanation. Combined
with the evidence in the prima faie case showing the plaintiff to be qualified and yet rejected,
unless other evidence to the contrary, the trier of fact is permitted to make an inference of
discrimination. However, without more guidance from the Court, a lower court could decide in
its discretion that the plaintiff is still required to present direct evidence of discrimination to
survive summary judgment. Because Hicks does not mandate when an inference of
discrimination is an appropriate finding of discrimination to satisfy the plaintiffs burden of
proof, lower courts can always decide that a finding of discrimination based on direct evidence
is always the more appropriate finding at the pretext stage.
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Hicks as securing a plaintiff's opportunity to survive summary judgment without
direct evidence, regardless of the court. First, I will briefly layout the facts in Aka
to provide a context for the discussion over summary judgment at the pretext
stage. Next, I will explain how the D.C. Circuit developed an analysis centered on
issues of credibility to determine whether a plaintiff can rely upon circumstantial
evidence to satisfy her burden of proof at the pretext stage. After explaining the
Hicks analysis, I will demonstrate how it was applied to the facts in Aka. I will
conclude by comparing the Aka analysis to a similar circuit court decision to
demonstrate why the D.C. Circuit got it right when it came to addressing the
debate over the pretext stage in the post-Hicks era.
A. Facts
Etim U. Aka (Aka), a fifty-six year-old man from Nigeria,112 worked as an
orderly for the Washington Hospital Center (WHC) for over nineteen years. 113
His duties included transporting patients and medical supplies to and from
operating rooms, and he frequently picked up medications from the hospital
pharmacy.114 Aka wanted to move up the ranks at WHC, and thus earned a
bachelor's degree and a master's degree in business and public administration in
health service management to improve his chances. 115
In 1991, Aka underwent heart bypass surgery and was in rehabilitation for
several months.1 16 He was told by his doctor only to engage in moderate levels of
exertion when he returned to work in 1992.117 Because the orderly position
required large amounts of heavy lifting and pushing, Aka asked WHC for a
transfer.1 18 However, WHC denied Aka's request and told him he would have to
seek vacant jobs with WHC on his own.119
Aka applied and interviewed for several positions at WHC, but was rejected
each time.120 One of the positions Aka applied for was the Central Pharmacy
Technician. 12 1 Although Aka had two degrees and nineteen years of experience at
WHC, including working with the pharmacy, he was rejected for the position.122
The person hired for the position had worked in WHC's laundry room for less
112 See id at 1286.
113 See id.
114 See id. at 1286, 1296.
l15 See id.
116 See id.
117 See id.
118 See id.
1 1 9 See id.
120 See id. at 1287.
121 See id
122 See id.
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than two years, and his only experience with the pharmacy was two months of
volunteering. 123 WHC explained that it rejected Aka for the technician position
because the hired applicant had more pharmacy experience, knowledge of
medical terminology, and greater enthusiasm for the position. 124
Aka filed suit against WHC under the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act (ADEA) in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.125
At issue was whether Aka could present circumstantial evidence to satisfy his
burden of proof at the pretext stage.126 The district court granted WHC's motion
for summary judgment with regard to all of Aka's claims.127 On the first appeal
to the D.C. Circuit, the district court's decision was vacated and remanded. 128
The D.C. Circuit held that Aka presented enough evidence to show WIC's
explanation for the hiring decision was pretextual, and thus summary judgment
was inappropriate. 12 9 WHC moved for a rehearing en banc, and in a second
opinion, the D.C. Circuit again vacated the original grant of summary
judgment 30
B. Aka Interprets Hicks
The issue before the D.C. Circuit was whether the plaintiff could survive
summary judgment at the pretext stage of the McDonnell Douglas framework
when he only had circumstantial evidence. 131 To resolve this issue, the D.C.
123 See id. at 1295-96.
124 See id. at 1296.
125 See Aka v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., No. 94-1281, 1996 WL 430526, at *1 (D. D.C.
Mar. 29, 1996).
126 See id at *4 (explaining that a plaintiff must point to genuine issues of material fact in
order to overcome sunmary judgment).
127 See id at *1.
128 See Aka v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 116 F.3d 876, 897 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (en banc).
129 See id at 889.
130 The D.C. Circuit originally vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment to
the defendant because it found Aka had presented enough evidence to discredit the defendant's
proffered reason. See id. It held that under Hicks, if a trier of fact was presented with evidence
that was sufficient to show both that the plaintiff had made a prima facie case and discredited
the defendant's reasons, the trier of fact could find discrimination had been proven. See id. at
880-81; see also Kolstad v. American Dental Ass'n, 108 F.3d 1431, 1436 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(interpreting Hicks in the same manner as Aka); Barbour v. Merrill, 48 F.3d 1270, 1277 (D.C.
Cir. 1995) (same).
131 The D.C. Circuit began by framing the split in the circuits around the types of
evidence a plaintiff can present at the pretext stage. See Aka, 156 F.3d at 1288-89.
Assuming a defendant presents a nondiscriminatory reason for its actions, the crux of the
plaintiff's case becomes the opportunity to demonstrate that the defendant's explanation is
false. See id. at 1289. The language in Hicks recognized three types of evidence a plaintiff
could use: (1) elements of the prima facie case; (2) evidence discrediting the defendant's
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Circuit addressed the important questions left unclear by the Supreme Court in
Hicks. Specifically, when is an inference of discrimination based on proof of
pretext and the evidence presented in the prima facie case an appropriate finding
of discrimination? Does a court have the discretion to decide when a plaintiff is
permitted to present circumstantial evidence and when she is required to present
direct evidence of discrimination?
1. What Is an Appropriate Finding?
In Hicks, the Supreme Court stated that "disbelief of the reasons put forward
by the defendant (particularly if disbelief is accompanied by a suspicion of
mendacity) may, together with the elements of the prima facie case, suffice to
show intentional discrimination." 132 The Court clarified this holding by stating
that there must be a "finding of discrimination" for a plaintiff to satisfy her burden
of proof at the pretext stage.133 The Court's language indicates that a plaintiff is
not presumptively required to show direct evidence of discrimination to satisfy
her burden.134 Rather, as the word "may" suggests, in certain situations a plaintiff
could persuade the trier of fact that she was a victim of intentional discrimination
by combining proof of pretext with the evidence presented in the prima facie
case. 135 Therefore, under Hicks, an inference of discrimination qualifies as a
"finding of discrimination' in the context of satisfying the plaintiff's burden of
proof at the pretext stage. 136
The D.C. Circuit interprets this language in Hicks as giving considerable
evidentiary weight to proof that the employer's reason is false. 137 If a plaintiff
explanation; and (3) additional evidence of discrimination outside of what was presented
in the prima facie case. See id. But in most employment discrimination cases, plaintiffs
usually present evidence only from categories (1) and (2). See United States Postal Serv.
Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716 (1983). Thus, the focus of the proceeding
at the pretext stage is whether evidence from these two categories is enough to make a
strong inference of discrimination that will allow the plaintiff to survive summary
judgment SeeAka, 156 F.3d at 1289.
132 St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993).
133 See supra notes 103-109 and accompanying text (discussing the lack of guidance
from the Supreme Court on what is an appropriate finding of discrimination).
134 See supra notes 98-102 and accompanying text.
135 See generally Hicks, 509 U.S. at 509-11. The Court stated that proof of pretext could
combine with elements of the prima facie case to permit an inference of discrimination. See id.
However, the plaintiff is not required to show pretext See id. at 509. That is, under the language
in Hicks, a plaintiff could still survive summary judgment with direct evidence of
discrimination. See id. at 509-11. Therefore, Hicks recognized proof of pretext, the prima facie
case, and direct evidence of discrimination as the types of evidence a plaintiff could present at
the pretext stage. See id
13 6 See supra text accompanying notes 87-94.
137 See Aka v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1292 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en banc).
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presents evidence that shows the defendant's proffered reason is unbelievable, the
plaintiff rebuts the defendant's nondiscriminatory explanation for the adverse
action. 138 The only credible evidence that remains in the record is the evidence
presented in the prima facie case showing the plaintiff to be qualified and yet
rejected for a position. However, we generally assume that an employer acts with
some reason, whether permissible or impermissible.139 Thus, when a plaintiff
discredits the defendant's legitimate reason-showing it to be a lie and not simply
a mistake-the trier of fact may, in the appropriate case, infer that the real reason
was an illegitimate one.140 Therefore, under the Aka analysis, proof of pretext has
considerable evidentiary weight because it rebuts the defendant's proffered reason
and then combines with the evidence from the prima facie case to infer
discrimination.141
However, in Hicks, the Supreme Court also rejected the notion that a plaintiff
could satisfy her burden of proof by simply relying upon the initial presumption
of discrimination from the prima facie case after she rebuts the defendant's
explanation.142 Once a defendant sets forth a legitimate explanation, the
presumption from the prima facie case drops from the case.143 The presumption
cannot later be resurrected simply because the plaintiff rebuts the defendant's
explanation at the pretext stage. 144 If a plaintiff were permitted to rely on the
initial presumption, it would relieve her of part of her dual burden. For example,
after showing the defendant's reason is false, she relies on the initial presumption
of discrimination instead of satisfying her ultimate burden of proving she is a
victim of intentional discrimination. Thus, despite the weight proof of pretext may
have at the pretext stage, it will not have enough weight to sustain a finding of
discrimination if it fails to combine proof of pretext with the evidence from the
prima facie case to establish a new inference of discrimination. 145
13 8 See id.
139 See id. at 1292-93 (holding unless an employer's acts are otherwise explained, once
they are rebutted we are willing to presume that they "are more likely than not based on
consideration of impermissible factors") (citing Fumco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567,
577 (1978)).
140 See Furnco, 438 U.S. at 577. In Furnco, the Court explained why a plaintiff is entitled
to a judgment if a defendant does not rebut her prima facie case of discrimination with a
legitimate explanation. The Court's rationale was that absent an explanation, we infer an
illegitimate one because we assume that an employer acts with some reason, either permissible
or impermissible. See id The D.C. Circuit adopts this same logic for the pretext stage: if a
plaintiff rebuts the defendant's explanation, and no other legitimate explanation exists, the trier
of fact is permitted to infer discrimination. See Aka, 156 F.3d at 1293-94.
141 See Aka, 156 F.3d at 1293-94.
142 See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. I-icks, 509 U.S. 502,510 (1993).
143 See id. at 510-11.
144 See id.
145See id at 511 & n.4. The Court stated that proof of pretext when combined with
elements of the prima facie case "may" permit an inference of discrimination. See id The Court
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The D.C. Circuit resolves the question of when proof of pretext has enough
weight to establish an inference of discrimination that qualifies as a finding of
discrimination by focusing on issues of credibility.146 For example,147 the
defendant explains that the plaintiff was fired due to poor work performance and
customer complaints. 148 The defendant provides testimony from the plaintiff's
supervisor to support the explanation, but claims it does not have the written
complaints or evaluations. The plaintiff rebuts this explanation with testimony
from several co-workers that claim the plaintiff was a good worker and always
received compliments from customers. In addition, the plaintiff testifies that she
received good performance evaluations and was never told about the complaints.
The case turns on whose account of the plaintiff's performance is correct, which
is a question that rests on both the plaintiff's and defendant's credibility.
The plaintiff's evidence, based on witness testimony, is sufficient to persuade
the trier of fact that the defendant's explanation is unbelievable. In contrast, the
defendant is lacking written evidence to support the explanation and has provided
no other reason for firing the plaintiff. Moreover, the witness testimony shows the
plaintiff to be a valuable employee, and thus the testimony is strong enough to
permit a trier of fact to infer that the defendant's explanation is a lie and not
simply a mistake based on the facts. 149 As a result, the defendant's explanation is
rebutted, and the only credible evidence in the record is from the prima facie case,
showing the plaintiff to be qualified and yet rejected for the position. Therefore,
without any other plausible explanation, the issue of credibility raised in the proof
later concluded that although proof of pretext sustains a finding of discrimination, there must be
a finding of discrimination. See id. These two statements combined mean that proof of pretext
can support an inference of discrimination if it combines with the evidence from the prima facie
to establish a new inference of discrimination. See id The Court's decision appears reasonable
in light of the plaintiff's burden of proof: show the defendant's reason is false and show that
discrimination is the real reason. See id If a plaintiff simply relies on the initial presumption of
discrimination, it would relieve her of most of her burden at the pretext stage-namely the
burden of proving that the real reason for the defendant's adverse action is discrimination. See
id.
146 See Aka, 156 F.3d at 1297-99 (discussing how the plaintiff's proof of pretext raises
issues of credibility over whose account of the facts is correct, which then combines with the
evidence in the prima facie case to permit a strong inference of discrimination).
1477Te D.C. Circuit's analysis of how proof of pretext that raises an issue of credibility
can combine with the evidence in the prima facie case to make a sufficient inference of
discrimination comes largely from the facts in Aka. For an example of how the analysis is
applied to the facts, see infra notes 154-83 and accompanying text. But for purposes of
explaining how the Aka analysis works, I have chosen to do so by my own example to increase
understanding.
148 For this example, assume that the plaintiff established a prima faie case showing her
to be qualified and yet rejected for the position in question.
149 See, e.g., Aka, 156 F.3d at 1293 ("If the [trier of fact] can infer that the employer's
explanation is not only a mistaken one in terms of the facts, but a lie, that should provide even
stronger evidence of discrimination.").
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of pretext combines with the evidence in the prima facie case to permit a new and
sufficient inference of discrimination. This demonstrates that, under the Aka
analysis, an inference of discrimination is an appropriate finding of discrimination
to satisfy a plaintiff's burden at the pretext stage. However, it is only an
appropriate finding of discrimination if proof of pretext raises an issue of
credibility that combines with the evidence presented in the prima facie case to
permit a strong inference of discrimination.
The Aka analysis is supported by three conclusions in Hicks. First, the D.C.
Circuit's opinion reflects the Supreme Court's holding that in some situations a
plaintiff may combine proof of pretext with evidence from the prima facie case to
make a showing of intentional discrimination. 150 Second, the Aka analysis gives
proof of pretext considerable evidentiary weight at the pretext stage only if it
satisfies the plaintiffs burden of proof by helping establish a sufficient finding of
discrimination. 151 Finally, the Supreme Court in Hicks stated that the defendant's
burden of production precedes the credibility assessment stage. 152 Thus, in light
of these conclusions in Hicks, the D.C. Circuit's analysis is based upon issues of
credibility to determine when a plaintiff can rely on an inference of discrimination
to survive summary judgment at the pretext stage is appropriate.
2. Who Decides?
A related question to whether an inference of discrimination is an appropriate
finding of discrimination in order to satisfy a plaintiff s burden at the pretext stage
is who decides when it is appropriate. Specifically, does a lower court have the
discretion to decide when a plaintiff is permitted to rely on circumstantial
evidence and when she is required to present direct evidence of discrimination?
Under the Aka analysis, a plaintiff can survive summary judgment without direct
evidence when her proof of pretext raises an issue of credibility and then
combines with the evidence presented in the prima facie case to permit a strong
inference of discrimination. It has long been held that issues of credibility are
"quintessentially" ones for the jury.153 Therefore, under the Aka analysis of when
a plaintiff can employ the opportunity to survive summary judgment without
direct evidence that was preserved in Hicks, lower courts have no discretion to
150 See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 511-12.
151 See supra notes 132-41 and accompanying text
152 See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 509 (holding whether a defendant's explanation is credible is
irrelevant because the "burden of production ... can involve no credibility assessment [flor the
burden-of-production determination necessarily precedes the credibility-assessment stage").153 See Aka, 156 F.3d at 1299 ("Determining the weight and credibility of witness
testimony ... has long been held to be the 'part of every case that belongs to the jury, who are
presumed to be fitted for it by their natural intelligence and their practical knowledge of men
and the ways of men."') (citing United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 308 (1998) (quoting
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 140 U.S. 76, 88 (1891)).
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require a plaintiff to present direct evidence at the pretext stage.
C. Applying the Aka Analysis of Hicks to the Facts
To explain the Aka analysis of Hicks, the D.C. Circuit applied it to the facts of
Aka.154 In other words, the D.C. Circuit demonstrated how under Hicks a plaintiff
could survive summary judgment at the pretext stage with circumstantial
evidence. As recognized in Hicks, defendants often rebut the presumption of
discrimination with a subjective reason for their actions.' 55 For example, personal
animus towards a plaintiff, whether articulated by the defendant or in the record,
could qualify as a defendant's legitimate explanation.' 56 The trier of fact need not
find the defendant's reason credible; it must only find that the defendant's
explanation is legitimate and nondiscriminatory. 157 The credibility assessment
stage comes after the defendant satisfies the burden of production.158 Thus, when
a defendant proffers an explanation, the trier of fact's only duty is to determine if
an issue of fact exists as to whether the plaintiff was a victim of discrimination. 159
Although subjective reasons may satisfy the defendant's burden of
production, the reasons are evaluated differently at the pretext stage.160 For
example, in Aka the defendant stated that a lack of experience in pharmacy
services, knowledge of the field, and enthusiasm for the pharmacy position were
the reasons why the plaintiff was not hired.1 61 This qualified as a legitimate and
nondiscriminatory reason because it essentially claimed that the defendant did not
find the plaintiff "qualified" for the position under its own criteria. 162
However, evidence from the plaintiff's prima facie case showed that he was
indeed qualified, if not over qualified, for the pharmacy position.1 63 The plaintiff
had nineteen years of experience at WHC as an orderly.164 During these nineteen
years, the plaintiff had made frequent trips to the pharmacy to pick up and deliver
medications to and from the pharmacy.' 65 Moreover, the record showed that
during these frequent visits, the plaintiff had acquired knowledge of the names of
154 See id at 1294-1300.
155 See discussion supra note 84.
156 SeeAka, 156 F.3d at 1298.
157 See id. at 1298-99.
158 See supra note 84 and accompanying text
159 See St Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502,509-11 (1993).
160 See id at 509.
161 SeeAka, 156 F.3d at 1294-96.
162 See id at 1294-95.
163 See id at 1294-97 (noting that Aka had prior pharmacy experience and sufficient
knowledge of medical terminology).
164 See id. at 1296.
16 5 See id.
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various medications, the general functions of the medications, the manner in
which the medications were to be administered, and the medications that were
considered dangerous. 166 In contrast, the hired applicant's experience was limited
to one year of employment in WHC's laundry room and two months of volunteer
experience in the pharmacy. 167 The defendant cited the hired applicant's
employment in a medical laboratory as proof of his knowledge of terminology. 68
However, his duties were primarily limited to picking up and delivering medical
specimens-not medications. Thus, it would be reasonable for the trier of fact to
conclude that the hired applicant did not have much knowledge of medical
terminology.169
Aka combined evidence from his prima facie case with witness testimony to
raise an issue of credibility over whether he had expressed enthusiasm for the
position.170 The defendant stated that the plaintiff had shown a lack of enthusiasm
during the interview171 and claimed that this influenced the decision not to hire
him' 72 In support of this explanation, the defendant noted that the hired applicant
had demonstrated his enthusiasm by previously applying for the position and then
volunteering in the pharmacy after he was rejected to increase his future chances
of being hired.173 However, there was ample evidence in the record that showed
the plaintiff expressed enthusiasm for the job equal to, or even more than, the
hired applicant's enthusiasm. For example, because the plaintiff wanted to move
up the ranks at WHC, he successfully pursued both a bachelor's degree and a
master's degree in hospital administration. 174 The plaintiff also volunteered in
various administrative jobs during his nineteen years at the hospital.' 75
Furthermore, the plaintiff testified that he recalled verbalizing his enthusiasm for
the pharmacy position during the interview.1 76
Although the defendant's subjective criteria was initially a legitimate reason
for not hiring Aka, it loses its legitimacy if the plaintiff rebuts the reason at the
pretext stage.' 77 Aka presented evidence that he was qualified and yet rejected to
166 See id. at 1297.
167 See id. at 1295-96.
168 See id. at 1297.
169 See id.
170 See id at 1298.
171 See id at 1297.
172 See Id. at 1297-99. Although the defendant stated the plaintiff exhibited a lack of
enthusiasm, the interviewer did not write this down on the interview assessment sheet See id.
Thus it raises the question: if enthusiasm was an important qualification for the pharmacy
position, why was it not important enough for the interviewer to note in her initial assessment?
173 See id. at 1297-98.
17 4 See id. at 1298.
175 See id.
17 6 See id.
177 See id at 1292.
1654 [Vol. 60:1625
AKA V. WASHINGTON HOSPITAL CENTER
make a prima facie case of discrimination 78 The defendant successfully rebutted
Aka's prima facie case by stating he was not qualified for the position primarily
because he lacked enthusiasm for the job.17 9 However, at the pretext stage, Aka's
testimony about the interview indicated that he had expressed his enthusiasm to
the interviewer. 180 As a result, the circumstantial evidence raised an issue of
credibility: whose account of the interview was correct?1 81
The plaintiff's proof of pretext is sufficient to persuade a reasonable trier of
fact that the defendant's explanation is unbelievable.182 Moreover, this proof of
pretext raises an issue of credibility over whose account of the interview is
correct--did Aka express his enthusiasm for the position? If he did, then the
defendant lied about Aka failing to meet the subjective qualifications for the
position. If Aka did not express his enthusiasm, then the defendant's explanation
that the hired applicant was more enthusiastic is a legitimate explanation for not
hiring Aka. As such, under the D.C. Circuit's analysis, Aka's proof of pretext,
which raises an issue of credibility, combines with the evidence presented in the
prima facie case to persuade a trier of fact to permit an inference of
discrimination. Because issues of credibility are for a jury to decide, the D.C.
Circuit correctly held that Aka's claim should be presented before a jury.183
D. Conclusions from Aka
In this section, I will demonstrate why the D.C. Circuit's interpretation of
Hicks in Aka v. Washington Hospital Center is the correct analysis for
determining how a plaintiff survives summary judgment at the pretext stage with
circumstantial evidence. First, I will compare the Aka analysis to those circuit
courts that apply a "pretext-sometimes" approach to employment discrimination
cases. Second, based upon this comparison, I will explain why the D.C. Circuit
got it right when it came to interpreting and applying Hicks.
178 See id at 1294.
17 9 See id at 1297-98.
180 See id at 1298.
18 1 See id.
182 See id at 1299-1300.
183 See id.
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1. "Pretext-Sometimes"
After Hicks, a new middle ground emerged,' 84 holding that in the appropriate
case circumstantial evidence discrediting the defendant's explanation will
combine with evidence from the prima facie case to support an inference of
intentional discrimination.185 An appropriate situation is defined as one in which
substantial evidence in the record supports a finding that the defendant's reasons
were false and that a reasonable inference of discrimination can be drawn from
that evidence.186 That is, an appropriate situation is one in which a plaintiff
satisfies her burden of proof at the pretext stage with circumstantial evidence.
For example, evidence in the record shows that the defendant had fabricated
the reasons for not hiring the plaintiff, and there was not a credible explanation to
the contrary.187 In addition, evidence from the prima facie case proves that the
plaintiff is qualified for the position in question. Pretext-sometimes courts would
conclude that such evidence permits a reasonable inference of discrimination and
that no additional evidence is required.188
184 As will be discussed, "pretext-sometimes" is different from those "permissive pretext"
courts, which created the middle ground in the post-Burdine debate over the pretext stage. See
supra notes 73-76 and accompanying text. Following Burdine, permissive pretext courts tried
to maintain a middle ground between pretext-always and pretext-plus courts. They held that
upon proof of pretext a trier of fact may, but is not required to, permit an inference of
discrimination. But the Supreme Court dismissed the permissive pretext approach in Hicks
when it stated definitively that proof of pretext may permit an inference of discrimination if it
combines with elements from the prima facie case. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509
U.S. 502,511 (1993).
• 185 See, e.g., Barnett v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 153 F.3d 338, 341-42 & n.4 (6th Cir.
1998) (holding that a plaintiff may rely on circumstantial evidence in the record and stating that
"Hicks merely requires that the fact-finder decide the case on the facts"); Fisher v. Vassar
College, 114 F.3d 1332, 1338-40 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that a plaintiff can rely on a finding of
pretext and evidence from a prima facie case if it establishes "intentional discrimination by a
preponderance of the evidence"); Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil Tools, 75 F3d 989, 994 (5th Cir.
1996) (holding that a plaintiff could use circumstantial evidence from her prima facie case,
which "[i]n tandem with ... the evidence allowing rejection of the employer's proffered
reasons will often, perhaps usually, permit a finding of discrimination without additional
evidence of discrimination"); Woodman v. Haemonetics Corp., 51 F.3d 1087, 1092 (1st Cir.
1995) ("The plaintiff-employee may rely upon the same evidence to establish both pretext and
discrimination, provided it is adequate to enable a rational factfinder to infer that the intentional
age-based discrimination was a determinative factor in the adverse employment action.").
186 See, e.g., Fisher, 114 F3d at 1338-40; Rhodes, 75 F.3d at 994; Udo v. Tomes, 54 F.3d
9, 13 (1st Cir. 1995); Woodman, 51 F.3d at 1092.
187 See Rhodes, 75 F.3d at 996.
188 See cases cited supra note 185.
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The Fifth Circuit exemplifies this pretext-sometimes position. In Rhodes v.
Guiberson Oil Tools,1 89 the Fifth Circuit affirmed a jury verdict that the plaintiff
had been discriminated against because of his age.190 Rhodes was a fifty-six year-
old salesman who was discharged after thirty years of employment with the
defendant.191 The defendant explained to Rhodes that his termination was due to
a reduction in the workforce and that he would be considered for rehiring when
the crisis ended.192 But two months later, a forty-two-year-old man was hired for
the same job. Evidence in the record revealed that his position was vacant for only
six weeks before it was refilled and that his supervisor had known at the time of
Rhodes's termination that he would be replaced. 193 However, the defendant did
not deny that it had lied to Rhodes about his discharge. 194 Rather, it defended its
actions by stating that Rhodes was terminated due to poor performance.1 95
The plaintiff s evidence in the record rebutted the defendant's explanation
with a question of credibility. Several witnesses testified that Rhodes was an
experienced and skilled salesman who was well regarded in his field.1 96 The Fifth
Circuit concluded that the conflict over Rhodes's testimony sufficiently
discredited the defendant's proffered reasons for his discharge. 197 Moreover,
Rhodes's prima facie case had proven him to be a qualified salesman. Therefore,
the Fifth Circuit held that proof of pretext and evidence from the prima facie case
combined could convince a reasonable jury that the defendant's reasons were
false and discrimination was the real reason.198
The Fifth Circuit's pretext-sometimes approach is parallel to the D.C.
Circuit's decision in Aka in several important respects. Both courts interpreted
Hicks as permitting the plaintiffs to satisfy their burdens of proof at the pretext
stage with circumstantial evidence. Moreover, these courts held that evidence of
pretext could combine with the plaintiff's prima facie case to support an inference
of intentional discrimination. Once this inference is established, both the Aka and
Rhodes courts conclude that the plaintiff is not required to present additional
evidence of discrimination to satisfy her burden of proof. Therefore, based upon
these similarities, the D.C. Circuit's interpretation of Hicks gains support from
189 75 F.3d 989 (5th Cir. 1996).
190 See id at 996-97.
191 See id at 991-92.
192 See id. at 992.
193 See id at 995.
194 See id
195 See id
196 See id at 995-96.
197 See id at 996 (explaining that the jury was entitled to find the defendant's proffered
reasons to be false).
198 See id
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courts like the Fifth Circuit who take the middle ground in the debate over
pretext.
However, the Aka and Rhodes courts differ over the use of issues of
credibility to help determine whether a plaintiff survives sunmay judgment at
the pretext stage.' 99 The Fifth Circuit appeared convinced that Rhodes had raised
questions of credibility in which a reasonable juror could make a finding of
discrimination based upon the evidence. But the Rhodes court did not go so far as
to conclude that proof of pretext deserves considerable evidentiary weight to
satisfy a plaintiffs burden of proof when it raises issues of credibility that
combine with evidence in the prima facie case to establish an inference of
discrimination. It may be reasonable to assume, based upon the evidence before
the court and its ultimate holding, that the Fifth Circuit finds this to be the
appropriate standard for a plaintiffs burden of proof at the pretext stage. But the
Rhodes court did not go so far as to specifically state this in its opinion.
Thus, despite supportive similarities between the standard in Aka and the
pretext-sometimes approach demonstrated in Rhodes, the D.C. Circuit's
interpretation of Hicks is independent from all other courts. It is an analysis of
circumstantial evidence that is unabashedly based upon issues of credibility and
can be applied to most employment discrimination cases at the pretext stage. For
example, consider the outcome in Rhodes under the Aka analysis if the issue were
whether the plaintiff presented a material issue of fact to survive summary
judgment at the pretext stage. The record of evidence would show Rhodes to be a
qualified salesman. In addition, conflicting testimony over those qualifications
would raise an issue of credibility; while Rhodes and other witnesses testified to
Rhodes's skill and expertise, the defendant claims that Rhodes had poor job
performance. The Fifth Circuit's pretext-sometimes interpretation of Hicks would
compel it to find that Rhodes had fulfilled his burden of proof: the evidence
showed that the defendant's reasons were false, and this proof of pretext
permitted an inference of discrimination.
199 See supra notes 147-149 and accompanying text. The two courts also differ in the
sense that the plaintiff in Rhodes had already been before a jury. Thus, the D.C. Circuit's
discussion focused on summary judgment, whereas the Fifth Circuit's decision dealt with
judgment as a matter of law. As a result, there were some natural differences in the courts'
analysis. Therefore, perhaps the Fifth Circuit's analysis did not cover or incorporate issues of
credibility because Rhodes had already been to trial. But the Rhodes court wrote the opinion to
encompass the issue of how a plaintiff can survive summary judgment. See id. at 993.
Moreover, incorporating issues of credibility into an analysis of a motion for judgment as a
matter of law would be appropriate considering issues of credibility are for the jury to decide.
Thus, if a plaintiff presents evidence showing the defendant's explanation is false and raises
issues of credibility that combine with the circumstantial evidence the plaintiff presented, the
jury could infer the plaintiff was a victim of intentional discrimination. As such, the defendant's
motion for a judgment as a matter of law would be denied. Therefore, the Fifth Circuit's failure
to include issues of credibility into the Rhodes analysis was more likely an oversight of the
significance of such issues.
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Under the Aka analysis of Hicks, the Fifth Circuit's conclusion would be
stated differently, but the substance of the holding would still be the same. That is,
proof of pretext raised an issue of credibility over whether Rhodes was qualified
for the position. This issue of credibility, combined with the evidence in the prima
facie case, showed that the plaintiff was qualified and yet fired. Thereby, a strong
inference of discrimination is created. Because issues of credibility are for a jury
to decide, the Fiftfh Circuit would arrive at the same conclusion as the D.C. Circuit
in Aka: summary judgment is inappropriate, and the case should go to trial.
2. Why Aka Got it Right
The comparison between Rhodes and Aka is important because it supports the
conclusion that the D.C. Circuit got it right when in it came to interpreting and
applying Hicks. Under the Aka analysis, the Supreme Court permits the plaintiff
to use either direct or circumstantial evidence to satisfy her burden of proof at the
pretext stage. This is a reasonable conclusion considering most plaintiffs in
employment discrimination cases do not have direct evidence that their employers
were motivated by discrimination.200 But the Supreme Court wanted to ensure
that if a plaintiff relied upon circumstantial evidence, she would not simply prove
pretext and then rely upon the initial presumption of discrimination from the
prima facie case.201 The Supreme Court resolved its concern that defendants
would be held liable without proof of discrimination by requiring plaintiffs to
show that the defendant's reasons were false and that discrimination was the real
reason2 02 The plaintiff must satisfy this burden of proof whether she presents
circumstantial or direct evidence.
The D.C. Circuit demonstrated how a plaintiff satisfies this burden at the
pretext stage when she presents circumstantial evidence. Aka's experience and
recollection of stating his enthusiasm for the position in the interview were clearly
stated in the record.203 This raised a question over the defendant's credibility, for
it claimed that Aka was not qualified for the job and expressed no enthusiasm for
the position to the interviewer.20 4 Thus, the evidence that discredited the
defendant's reason thereby rebutted its explanation and raised an issue of
credibility over which account of the facts was correct. With no other credible
explanation, proof of pretext combined with the evidence in the prima facie
case-showing the defendant to be qualified and yet rejected-to establish a new
inference of discrimination. As a result, the Aka analysis compliments the two
200 See United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716 (1983)
('Tbhere will seldom be 'eyewitness' testimony as to the employer's mental processes").
201 See supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text.
20 2 See Aka v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1293 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en bane).
203 See id at 1298.
2 0 4 See id at 1299.
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significant effects the Hicks decision had on employment discrimination
jurisprudence. First a defendant is not held liable unless plaintiffs persuade the
trier of fact that they are more likely than not the victims of intentional
discrimination. Second, plaintiffs have a realistic opportunity of satisfying their
burdens of proof and having a jury decide their claims.
V. IMPACT OFAKA v WASHJNGTONHOSPITAL CENTER
In this section, I will argue that the Aka analysis itself is significant to
employment discrimination jurisprudence for three reasons. First, it interprets
Hicks consistently with the language of the whole opinion, and thus diffuses
extreme positions in the debate over pretext that focus only on selected language
in Hicks. Second, the analysis ensures that plaintiffs will have a realistic
opportunity to make their claims. Therefore, Aka is consistent with a recent
Supreme Court trend that favors the expansion of a plaintiff's opportunity to
make her claim. Finally, the Aka analysis is consistent with the overall purpose of
antidiscrimination statutes that provide employees the opportunity to hold their
employers liable for the discrimination they encounter in the workplace.
A. Diffusing the Extremes
In the post-Burdine era, two extreme positions developed. Some circuit
courts held that a plaintiff's circumstantial evidence to prove pretext was enough
to permit a reasonable trier of fact to make an inference of intentional
discrimination.205 Other courts required plaintiffs to provide additional evidence
of discrimination beyond proof of pretext to satisfy their burdens of proof.2 0 6
These "pretext-always" and "pretext-plus" courts did not change their position
after Hicks. But in light of the D.C. Circuit's recent interpretation and application
of Hicks, Aka v. Washington Hospital Center shows that these positions in the
debate over pretext are inconsistent with the language in Hicks. Therefore, in this
section, I will contrast the Aka analysis with the "pretext-always" and "pretext-
plus" positions to demonstrate why the D.C. Circuit is the more appropriate
interpretation of Hicks.
205 See supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text (discussing the "pretext-always"
approach).
206 See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text (discussing the "pretext-plus"
approach).
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1. "Pretext-Always"
The Third Circuit used Sheridan v. El. DuPont de Nemours & Co.20 7 as an
opportunity to clarify its opinion on the kind of evidence a plaintiff must present
to persuade the fact finder that she was a victim of intentional discrimination.20 8
In Sheridan, the plaintiff (Sheridan) was a Head Captain in one of the defendant's
hotel dining rooms.209 Sheridan had complained about a failure to promote her,
and as a consequence, she claimed that the defendant retaliated against her by
taking disciplinary action and creating a difficult work environment. 2 10 In
response, Sheridan sued the defendant for sex discrimination and retaliation.2 I
The record of evidence showed that Sheridan was considered a valuable and
highly regarded employee3 12 She had received favorable evaluations from her
supervisors and was rated an outstanding employee by her peers. 213 However, the
defendant claimed that Sheridan's performance was deteriorating and that
management had received complaints about her performance.2 14 The defendant's
strongest defense was that Sheridan had given away free food and drinks
("comping") while she was on duty.215 The defendant claimed Sheridan's
comping started an investigation into her behavior and resulted in a decision to
reassign Sheridan to another position.216
207 100 F.3d 1061 (3d Cir. 1996).
208 See id. at 1063. It is important to note that at issue in Sheridan was the defendant's
motion for judgment as a matter of law. See id Thus, similar to the Fifth Circuit's decision in
Rhodes, see supra text accompanying note 18, there are differences between the D.C. Circuit's
opinion in Aka and the Third Circuit in Sheridan. But both situations require an assessment of
whether the evidence permits a finding of discrimination, and thus the standards they set forth
are comparable. Moreover, the Third Circuit addressed the issue of pretext specifically to put
forth its interpretation and application of Hicks. See Sheridan, 100 F.3d at 1066-67. Therefore,
the Third Circuit wrote its opinion broadly enough to encompass both motions for judgment as
a matter of law and surnmary judgment.
It is also important to note that the district court judge decided some of the issues in the
case. See i& at 1063. The conduct subject to the suit spanned before and after November 21,
1991, the date the 1991 Civil Rights Act was enacted, which granted plaintiffs the opportunity
of a jury trial. See iat at 1063-64 (citing Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105
Stat. 1071 (1991)). Therefore, a jury served as the fact finder for conduct that occurred after
such date, and the judge would be the fact finder for the conduct prior to such date.
20 9 See idt at 1063.
210 See id.
2 11 Seeid.
2 12 See id. at 1072-73.
2 13 See id.
2 14 See id. at 1073.
2 15 See id. at 1074.
2 16 Seeid.
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Sheridan rebutted the defendant's explanation by testifying that the defendant
did not consider female employees for managerial positions. 217 When she
complained that this failure to promote was gender discrimination, Sheridan
claimed her supervisor warned her that he planned to watch her closely.218 In
response to the alleged comping, Sheridan presented evidence that showed she
was on jury duty during a period she allegedly gave away free drinks.2 19 A jury
found for the defendant on the failure to promote and retaliation claims, but found
for Sheridan on her constructive discharge claim.2 20
The jury awarded Sheridan compensatory damages,221 and the defendant
moved for a judgment as a matter of law. The district court ruled in the
defendant's favor.222 The district court held that although Sheridan's evidence
showed the defendant's explanations for the investigation to be pretextual,
nothing in the record showed that the defendant's motivation was gender
discrimination. 223
Deciding the case for a second time,2 24 the Third Circuit stated that it
understood Hicks to permit a trier of fact to find an inference of discrimination
from evidence in the prima facie case and proof of pretext.2 25 It also interpreted
Hicks as requiring plaintiffs to show the defendant's reasons are false and that
discrimination is the real reason in order to survive summary judgment or
judgment as a matter of law.226 However, the Third Circuit defined the two
prongs of the plaintiff's burden of proof as conjunctive: a plaintiff must show,
with circumstantial or direct evidence, that (1) the defendant's reasons are false,
or (2) it is more likely than not that the defendant was motivated by
discrimination.227 The court found that under Hicks, requiring a plaintiff to prove
more than pretext to sustain a finding of discrimination is inconsistent with the
plaintiff's burden of persuasion. Under Hicks, a plaintiff is only required to
present enough evidence to establish a finding of discrimination.2 28 Thus, because
217 See id.
2 18 See id.
2 19 Seeid.
220 See id
221 See id. at 1064.
222 See id.
223 See Sheridan v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., No. 93-46, 1994 WL 828309, at *9
(D. Del. July 14, 1994). The district court found that Sheridan's supervisor warning to her that
she would be watched did not support an inference that gender was a motivating factor in the
defendant's decision. See id.224 See Sheridan v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., No. 94-7509, 1996 WL 36283, at *1
(3d Cir. Jan. 31, 1996), vacated, 74 F.3d 1459 (3d Cir. 1996).
225 See Sheridan, 100 F.3d at 1066-67.
226 See id. at 1067 (citing Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F3d 759,764 (3d Cir. 1994)).
227 See id.
228 See id. at 1068-69.
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a prima facie case permits an inference of discrimination, the Sheridan court
concluded that this was an appropriate finding to fulfill a plaintiff's burden at the
pretext stage.229
Although the prima facie case drops once the defendant proffers a legitimate
and nondiscriminatory reason, the evidence used in the prima facie case still has
probative value.2 30 Thus, a plaintiff can combine proof of pretext with the
elements of the prima facie case to support an inference of discrimination.231 The
Third Circuit concluded that a plaintiff can survive summary judgment or
judgment as a matter of law if she provides enough circumstantial evidence to
create a genuine issue of material fact that the defendant's proffered reasons were
untrue.2 32 Based upon wilness testimony and the evidence in the prima facie case,
the court held that Sheridan had presented enough circumstantial evidence to lead
a reasonable jury to disbelieve the defendant and reject its credibility.233
Therefore, the Third Circuit held that the jury was permitted to find for Sheridan
on her constructive discharge claim.2 34
The D.C. Circuit agreed with the Third Circuit that proof of pretext and
elements of the prima facie case could combine to permit an inference of
intentional discrimination. But the Aka court faulted the Third Circuit for taking
this interpretation too far.235 In Sheridan, the court interpreted Hicks as permitting
a plaintiff to prove either that the defendant's reason was unbelievable or that
discrimination was the real reason for the action. 36 The D.C. Circuit found this
an impermissible reading of Hicks in light of the Supreme Court's clear
requirement that a plaintiff prove both that the reason was false and that
discrimination was the real reason.237
The Aka court provided two examples to explain why the Third Circuit's
"pretext-always" interpretation of Hicks was inappropriate.3 8 First, plaintiffs
have been known to "shoot themselves in the foot" by acknowledging that a
nondiscriminatory reason was the defendant's motive in the adverse action.239
Second, plaintiffs often present weak circumstantial evidence to show that the
defendant's explanation was false, which does not sustain the finding of
229 See id. at 1069.
230 See id.
231 See id.
232 See id. at 1067.
233 See id. at 1075.
234 See id.
235 See Aka v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1289-90 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en
banc).236 See Shjrdan, 100 F.3d at 1069.
2 37 SeeAl'a, 156 F.3d at 1291-92.
238 See id at 1291.
239 See id.
1999] 1663
OHIO STATE LAWJOURNAL
discrimination from the prima facie case.2 40 In both examples, there is no
legitimate jury question as to discrimination. Thus, the D.C. Circuit concluded
that there is no point in sending either case to the jury without additional evidence
of discrimination. 241
A pretext-always court like the Third Circuit would never require additional
evidence of discrimination once the plaintiff presented enough circumstantial
evidence to convince the trier of fact that the defendant's explanation was
false.2 42 Thus, the D.C. Circuit was compelled to reject the Third Circuit's
interpretation of Hicks because it failed to fully enforce a plaintiff's burden. The
D.C. Circuit feared that the Third Circuit's analysis in Sheridan would result in
sending employment discrimination cases to a jury prematurely.243
It is important to note, however, that there are significant similarities in how
the D.C. Circuit and the Third Circuit interpret Hicks. For example, both courts
agree that Hicks permitted plaintiffs to present either direct or circumstantial
evidence to satisfy their burden of proof at the pretext-stage. 244 Moreover, both
courts found this option to be consistent with the Court's requirement for a
finding of intentional discrimination. That is, the D.C. Circuit and the Third
Circuit agreed that, regardless of whether a plaintiff presents direct or
circumstantial evidence, a plaintiff would still have to prove that the defendant's
reasons were false and that discrimination was the real reason.2 45
Despite the similarities in the D.C. Circuit's and the Third Circuit's
interpretation of Hicks, the courts split over how a plaintiff is required to satisfy
her burden of proof at the pretext stage. The Third Circuit described the plaintiff s
two-prong burden as conjunctive: a plaintiff must prove either that the
defendant's reason was false or that discrimination was the real reason.246 The
court reasoned that once a plaintiff proves pretext and combines it with evidence
from the prima facie case, she has made an inference of discrimination that
satisfies the finding of discrimination required by Hicks.247 However, it is hard to
ignore the Supreme Court's overt concern that a defendant should not be held
liable for discrimination if a plaintiff merely relies on the initial presumption of
discrimination, made in the prima facie case, after it was rebutted by 'the
defendant.248 Unless a court requires a new finding of discrimination at the
240 See id.
241 See id.
2 42 See Sheridin v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours and Co., 100 F.3d 1061, 1066-67 (3d Cir.
1996).
24 3 SeeAka, 156 F.3d at 1292.
244 CompareAka, 156 F.3d at 1292, with Sheridan, 100 F.3d at 1066-67.
245 Compare Aka, 156 F3d at 1292-93, with Sheridan, 100 F3d at 1068-69.
24 6 See Sheridan, 100 F.3d at 1066-67.
247 See id
248 See Aka, 156 F.3d at 1290-91 (holding that the D.C. Circuit was compelled to reject
the pretext-always position because the weight of pretext under Hicks must be interpreted
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pretext stage, it is likely that its application of Hicks will not satisfy the Supreme
Court's concerns for the defendant.
Because of an inherent inconsistency with the language in Hicks, the D.C.
Circuit rejected the Third Circuit's pretext-always approach. Alternatively, the
D.C. Circuit held that proof of pretext has considerable evidentiary weight when
it raises issues of credibility and combines with evidence from the prima facie
case to make a strong inference of discrimination.2 49 As a result, a plaintiff
renews the inference of discrimination and presents a material issue of fact for a
jury to decide. Therefore, the D.C. Circuit was able to balance the Supreme
Court's requirement that a finding of discrimination be made to protect
defendants with a plaintiff's opportunity to rely on circumstantial evidence to
survive summary judgment at the pretext stage.
2. "Pretext-Plus"
The First Circuit has held that although a plaintiffproves pretext by raising an
issue of the defendant's credibility, it must provide additional evidence to
persuade a trier of fact that the defendant was motivated by discrimination. In
Hidalgo v. Overseas Condado Insurance Agencies, Inc.,250 just before the
plaintiff's (Hidalgo) sixty-fifth birthday, his employer informed him that he was
expected to retire in accordance with company policy.251 After Hidalgo informed
the defendant that he did not intend to retire, the defendant explained to him that it
planned to eliminate his department by integrating it with another division and
that Hidalgo would not be extended an offer.252 Hidalgo sued the defendant for
age discrimination.2 53 The defendant claimed Hidalgo was terminated because his
division had become unprofitable, and it had received complaints about Hidalgo's
work performance2 54
The district court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment,
holding that Hidalgo failed to prove the defendant's reasons were pretextual or
provide additional evidence of the defendant's discriminatory motives.2 55 The
First Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, finding Hidalgo's
circumstantial evidence did not support a finding of intentional discrimination.2 56
The First Circuit interpreted Hicks as requiring plaintiffs to show that the
consistently with the Court's intentions and entire opinion).
249 See id. at 1292-94.
250 120 F.3d 328,337 (1st Cir. 1997).
251 Seeid. at 331.
252 See id.
253 See id
2 54 See id. at 334.
255 SeeHidalgo v. Overseas Condado Ins. Agencies, Inc., 929 F. Supp. 555, 561 (D. P.R.
1996).
256 See Hidalgo, 120 F3d at 337.
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defendant's explanation was pretext and that the real reason for the action was
discrimination. It also noted that a plaintiff could satisfy her burden with direct or
circumstantial evidence and that the defendant's proffered reason was not true. 57
Although the First Circuit conceded that evidence from the prima facie case
could have evidentiary weight and that an inference of discrimination could
satisfy the plaintiffs burden, it did not apply this standard in Hidalgo.2 58 Hidalgo
offered circumstantial evidence from the record to prove the defendant's
explanation was pretext and that discrimination was the real reason for his
termination. For example, witness testimony revealed that Hidalgo was qualified
for the position and that Hidalgo himself was never informed of any complaints
about his work performance.2 59 Moreover, evaluation sheets rated Hidalgo as a
valuable employee.260 By contrast, the defendant failed to provide any figures to
support its proffered explanation that Hidalgo was terminated because his division
was not profitable.2 6 1
The First Circuit assumed arguendo that Hidalgo established pretext,2 62 but
concluded that Hidalgo's circumstantial evidence failed to show that the
defendant was motivated by discriminatory animus.2 6 3 Interestingly, the First
Circuit did not really explain why it came to this conclusion. The only guidance
the First Circuit gave was that the ADEA does not prevent an employer from
terminating employees it wants to without evidence of discriminatory intent.264 In
this case, the evidence merely showed that the defendant expected its employees
to retire when they were eligible for retirement benefits.2 65 Thus, the First
Circuit's lack of reasoning suggests that a plaintiff must provide additional
evidence, outside of proof of pretext and evidence from the prima facie case, to
257 See id at 335.
258 See id.
259 See id at 335-36.
260 See id
261 See id.
262 See id. at 336-37. The First Circuit stated that whether Hidalgo established pretext was
a "close call." Id Hidalgo had used circumstantial evidence to raise an issue of credibility over
whether the defendant did in fact receive complaints about Hidalgo's work performance and
whether his department was losing money. See id According to Hidalgo, he was never told
about any such complaints nor was he shown any evidence that proved his department was
unprofitable. See id. Precedent in the First Circuit based on similar evidence stated such issues
should be decided by a jury. See, e.g., Mulero-Rodriguez v. Ponte, Inc., 98 F.3d 670, 675 (1st
Cir. 1996). But, without explanation, the court doubted whether Hidalgo's evidence was similar
enough to be guided by such precedent. See Hidalgo, 120 F.3d at 337. Nonetheless, because the
First Circuit based its decision on proof of discrimination, it concluded that Hidalgo established
pretext without deciding the issue. See id at 337.263 See Hidalgo, 120 F3d at 337.
264 See id
265 See id. at 337-38.
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persuade the trier of fact that she was a victim of discrimination.2 66
The D.C. Circuit properly criticized the First Circuit's decision as running
contrary to the complete holding of Hicks. The Aka court conceded that
circumstantial evidence that rebuts the defendant's proffered reason will not
always permit an inference of discrimination.267 But in Hicks, the Supreme Court
held that no additional evidence is necessary once the plaintiff has rebutted the
defendant's explanation with proof of pretex and then combines that proof with
evidence from the prima facie case to permit an inference of discrimination.2 68
Thus, the D.C. Circuit concluded that it is incorrect to interpret Hicks as
presumptively requiring plaintiffs to present additional evidence of discrimination
beyond that rebuttal. 69
In the Hidalgo opinion, the First Circuit gave no weight to the plaintiff's
rebuttal evidence without explaining why it was insufficient.270 Thus, the Hidalgo
court made its decision without properly considering the weight of the evidence
that raised issues of credibility over H-idalgo's alleged poor performance and low
266 For another example of "pretext-plus," see Thomas v. Randolph Hills Nursing Center,
No. 97-2642, 1998 WL 454088, at *1 (4th Cir. July 28, 1998). Following several similar
decisions, the Fourth Circuit held in Thomas that the pretext-plus position is the most favorable
interpretation of Hicks. See id. at *3. The court stated that proof of pretext does not diminish the
plaintiff's burden of persuading the trier of fact that discrimination motivated the defendant's
actions. See id. In Thomas, the plaintiff was a fifty-five year-old nurse and evening supervisor in
the West Wing of the hospital. See id. at *1. The plaintiff's hours were reduced when a thirty-
three year-old nurse was hired as the West Wing's Coordinator. See id.
The defendant explained its action by claiming the West Wing was not being properly rin,
and the hired nurse had management experience. See id. Moreover, the defendant had received
complaints from patients and doctors regarding the plaintiff, and the plaintiff had received a bad
work evaluation. See id. The plaintiff offered, as evidence in the pretext stage, testimony from
the Director of Nursing that she never signed nor remembered preparing a poor evaluation of
the plaintiffnor received any complaints about her. See id. In addition, the plaintiff claimed that
she always received good evaluations and had never received any complaints about her work.
See id. The record also showed that there was no documentation of any complaint. See id.
Adhering to a pretext-plus approach, the Fourth Circuit found that the plaintiff's evidence at
most made the defendant's evidence less credible, but she did not present any evidence of
"animus directed towards [the plaintiff] due to her age." Id. at *2; see also, e.g., Gillins v.
Berkeley Electric Cooperative, Inc., 148 F.3d 413, 416-17 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding that
although the plaintiff presented circumstantial evidence that raised a genuine issue of fact that
the defendant's reasons were false, the plaintiff did not fulfill his double duty because he did not
develop any evidence that the defendant was motivated by discrimination); Vaughn v.
Metrahealth Cos., Inc., 145 F3d 197, 202 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding that under a plaintiff's
double duty, pretext-plus is the best approach because it "preserves the character of statutes like
the ADEA as antidiscrimination statutes" due to the requirement that actual intentional
discrimination be proven).
267 See Aka v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1289 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en banc).
268 See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502,511 (1993).
26 9 SeeAka, 156 F.3d at 1291.
270 See Hildalgo, 120 F.3d at 336-37.
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profits.2 71 It simply dismissed this evidence as insignificant to show that the
defendant was motivated by age discrimination.2 72 However, as the D.C. Circuit
pointed out, Hicks permits a plaintiff to combine proof of pretext with the
evidence from the prima facie case to show intentional discrimination if it
establishes a strong inference of discrimination.2 73 Therefore, the D.C. Circuit
concluded that the First Circuit's apparent requirement that a plaintiff must do
more to survive summary judgment runs contary to the Supreme Court's
opinion.274
B. Supreme Court Employment Discrimination Trends
In two recent sexual harassment cases, the Supreme Court expanded the
protection over a plaintiff's opportunity to prove her claim in employment
discrimination jurisprudence. First, in Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth,275 the
Court held that a plaintiff s claim for damages against her employer is actionable
even if she suffered no tangible harm. Second, in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore
Services,276 the Court held that sexual harassment plaintiffs have actionable
claims even when it involves same-sex harassers. In this section, I will briefly
explain these two Supreme Court decisions and then discuss why the decisions
reveal a recent Supreme Court trend to expand the protection over a plaintiffs
opportunity to make her claim. I will conclude by arguing that the D.C. Circuit's
interpretation of Hicks is consistent with this trend because it protects a plaintiff s
opportunity to survive summary judgment and thus take her claims to a jury.277
The Supreme Court recently held that a plaintiff suing her employer for
sexual harassment could recover from the employer even though she did not
suffer any tangible employment consequences. 278 In Burlington Industries, Inc. v.
Ellerth, the plaintiff was subjected to offensive comments and gestures from a
vice president who supervised the plaintiffs division.279 Although several of
these comments were phrased as threats to the plaintiffs tangible job benefits, the
harasser was not the plaintiffs direct supervisor nor was he high up in the
271 See id
272 See id at 337-3 8.
2 73 See supra text accompanying notes 132-152.
2 74 See Aka, 156 F.3d at 1292 (holding that courts should not require plaintiffs to present
direct evidence of discrimination in order to prevail) (citing United States Postal Serv. Bd. of
Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711,714 n.3, 717 (1983)).
275 118 S. Ct. 2257 (1998).
276 118 S. Ct. 998 (1998).
277 See, e.g., Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981)
("Mhe plaintiffmust.., have an opportunity to prove... that the legitimate reasons offered by
the defendant were not its true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination.").
278 See Burlington Industries, 118 S. CL at 2270.
2 7 9 See id. at 2262.
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decision-making hierarchy.280 In fact, during the alleged harassment, the plaintiff
received a promotion from the defendant a8 1
The Court noted that Title VII guarantees employees opportunities to prove
that they have a discrimination claim and that their employer is liable.282 Thus,
the Court held that even when there are no tangible employment consequences,
an employer is liable for actionable hostile environment sexual harassment by a
supervisor who has successively higher authority than the plaintiff.2 83 However,
the Court also held that when no tangible action is taken, an employer has an
affirmative defense to liability. 284 Under this affirmative defense, a defendant has
the opportunity to show that (1) it exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct
the sexual harassment and (2) that the plaintiff did not reasonably take advantage
of these opportunities to avoid harm.285 If the defendant can successfully make
this defense, it will avoid liability.
It is important to note that the Supreme Court held that a defendant must
successfully prove both prongs of the affirmative defense before a plaintiffs
claim is dismissed.2 86 The Court stated that Title VII was designed to encourage
the creation of antisexual harassment policies and to ensure that the grievance
mechanisms were effective. 87 Although a plaintiff may not suffer any tangible
harm from the alleged harassment, an employer still has the obligation to create a
harassment-free workplace.2 88 By giving defendants an affirmative defense, the
Court's decision did acknowledge an important distinction in a defendant's
liability depending upon whether tangible harm resulted from the alleged
280 See id. The alleged harasser was a mid-level manager with the defendant See id.
Although the harasser had the authority to make hiring and promotion decisions, his decisions
were subject to the approval of his supervisor. See id.
281 See id.
282 See id. at 2270.
283 See id.
28 4 See id.; see also Faragher v. City ofBoca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275 (1998). The Supreme
Court considered Faragher as a companion case to Ellerth because it also addressed the issue
of employer liability for the harassing actions of one of its supervisors. Because Title VII gives
employers an affirmative obligation to prevent discrimination, the Court adopted the same
affirmative defense set forth in Ellerth for employers when a plaintiff has suffered no tangible
employment actions. See Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2270.
285 See Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2270.
286 See id. The Supreme Court held that the defendant must show that it exercised
reasonable care to prevent and correct the harassment and that the plaintiff failed to take
advantage of these preventive and corrective opportunities. The Court did not state that the
defendant could prove one prong or the other. Therefore, it is clear from the Supreme Court's
language, the defendant must prove both prongs to successfully make an affirmative defense.
2 87 See id. at 2270.
288 See id. ("Were employer liability to depend in part on an employer's effort to create
such procedures, it would effect Congress' intention to promote conciliation rather than
litigation in the Title VII context... :).
1999] 1669
OHIO STATE LAYWJOURNAL
harssmen 289 Nonetheless, the Court concluded that a plaintiff has an actionable
sexual harassment claim even if she does not suffer tangible harm, and it required
a defendant to prove both prongs of the affirmative defense before that claim of
harassment can be dismissed. As a result, the Court ensured that plaintiffs have a
fair opportunity to take their sexual harassment claims to a jury.
In another recent sexual harassment ease, Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore
Services, Inc., the Supreme Court held that same-sex sexual harassment is an
actionable claim under Title VII.290 Joseph Oncale was an employee on an oil
platform and worked with an eight-man crew.291 During his employment he was
subjected to sexually humiliating comments, actions, and physical assaults from
his male colleagues and supervisors.292 Although Oncale complained to
supervisory personnel, no remedial action was taken. 293 Eventually, Oncale
resigned from his position and sued for hostile environment sexual harassment
under Title VII.294
Both the district court and the Fifth Circuit found that he had no cause of
action for alleged harassment from male co-workers. The Supreme Court
reversed. 295 The Court noted that Title VII prohibits an employer from
discriminating against an individual because of her sex, race, or religion. 296 Based
upon this firm antidiscrimination policy, the Court held that Title VII does not
prohibit an employee from proving her employer is liable for discrimination
simply because her harassers are the same sex.2 97
The Supreme Court's opinion in Oncale is significant for two reasons. First,
the Court recognized same-sex sexual harassment as an actionable claim under
Title VII.298 Second, the Court extended the protection for a plaintiff's
2 89 See id. ("No affirmative defense is available, however, when the supervisor's
harassment culminates in a tangible employment action... ". The Court noted that the
affirmative defense does not apply in cases of alleged tangible harm from sexual harassment.
As a result, the Court made a distinction between the levels of risk of liability an employer faces
in the law of sexual harassment. That is, sexual harassment that results in tangible harm
deserves a heightened risk of liability for an employer, but sexual harassment that does not
result in tangible harm for the plaintiff presents less of a risk of liability.
29 0 See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 118 S. Ct. 998, 1003 (1998).
291 See id. at 1000-01.
292 See id. at 1001.
293 See id.
294 See id. ("When asked at his deposition why he left Sundowner, Oncale stated 'I felt
that if I didn't leave my job, that I would be raped or forced to have sex."').
295 See i. at 1003.
296 See id. at 1001-02 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994)).
297 See id at 1002-03.
298 However, it is important to note that, to date, the Supreme Court has not made
actionable an employment discrimination claim based on sexual orientation under Title VII.
Therefore, although same-sex sexual harassment is actionable, a distinction between actionable
and nonactionable claims will likely be made if it is alleged that the plaintiff was harassed
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opportunity to take her discrimination claims to a jury. By expanding the number
of actionable sexual harassment claims to include same-sex harassment, the Court
expanded the number of plaintiffs who are eligible to bring a discrimination claim
under Title VII. As a result, the Supreme Court in Oncale ensured that a
plaintiff's right to hold her employer liable was protected, and, therefore,
expanded her opportunity to prove her claim to ajury.
The Supreme Court's recent opinions in Ellerth and Oncale demonstrate a
trend in employment discrimination jurisprudence: plaintiffs must be afforded
broader opportunities to prove discrimination claims against their employers.299
The D.C. Circuit's interpretation of Hicks is consistent with this trend. It interprets
Hicks as permitting plaintiffs the opportunity to survive the pretext stage300 with
either direct or circumstantial evidence. 01 But the Aka analysis took the holding
in Hicks one step further in order to ensure a plaintiff's opportunity to survive
summary judgment at the pretext stage, with circumstantial evidence, is indeed
viable. To satisfy the plaintiff's burden of proof-that the defendant's proffered
reason is false and that discrimination is the real reason-a plaintiff can rely on
circumstantial evidence if proof of pretext combines with evidence from the
prima facie case to establish a showing of intentional discrimination.3 02 Under
Aka, a plaintiff establishes this inference when her proof of pretext raises an issue
of credibility that, combined with the evidence proving her to be qualified and yet
rejected, convinces the trier of fact that the plaintiff was more likely than not a
victim of discrimination.3 3
In such situations, the Aka analysis gives proof of pretext considerable weight
to help establish an inference of discrimination. Moreover, because issues of
because of her sexual orientation, not because of her sex.
299 See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973) ("Ihe broad,
overriding interest, shared by employer, employee, and consumer, is efficient and trustworthy
workmanship assured through fair and racially neutral employment and personnel decision. In
the implementation of such decisions, it is abundantly clear that Title VII tolerates
no ... discrimination, subtle or otherwise.").
300 See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981) (holding
that plaintiffs '"must have the opportunity to demonstrate that the proffered reason was not the
true reason for the employment decision").
301 See St. Mary's Honor Cir. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993) ("The factfinder's
disbelief of the reasons put forward by the defendant... may, together with the elements of the
prima facie case, suffice to show intentional discrimination.").
30 2 See id. at 515 ("[A] reason cannot be proved to be 'a pretextfor discrimination' unless
it is shown both that discrimination was false, and that discrimination was the real reason.")
(quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 258) (emphasis added).
303 See Aka v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1292-93, 1298-99 (D.C. Cir.
1998) (en banc).
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credibility are for a jury to decide, Aka ensures that lower courts cannot deny
plaintiffs the opportunity to use proof of pretext, and other circumstantial
evidence in the record, to survive summary judgment. Therefore, under the D.C.
Circuit's Aka analysis, Hicks did not place too heavy of a burden on plaintiffs to
make their claims. Rather, the Supreme Court balanced the plaintiff's burden of
persuasion under the McDonnell Douglas framework with the plaintiff's
opportunity to prove that her employer is liable for discrimination under Title VII.
As a result, the D.C. Circuit ensured that Hicks could be applied consistently with
the recent Supreme Court trend.
C. Purpose ofAntidiscrimination Statutes
The common element of all antidiscrimination statutes in the employment
context is that they provide individuals the "full and fair" opportunity to hold their
employers liable for discriminatory animus they encounter in the workplace.304
For example, Title VII of the 1964 Civil. Rights Act prohibits private
employers30 5 from failing or refusing to hire, discharge, or perform any other
employment action for the purpose of discriminating against an individual
because of her race, sex, national origin, or religion.306 Congress enacted a similar
provision in the ADEA, which prohibits employers from discriminating against
an employee "because of [an] individual's age."30 7 In 1990, Congress enacted the
ADA to protect an individual's right to provide for themselves economically in
order to live selfsufficiently.30 8 The 1991 Civil Rights Act expanded the scope of
Title VII by providing employment discrimination plaintiffs the right to a jury
trial.309 This was an attempt by Congress to provide plaintiffs better protection
from discrimination.310 Although these statutes only hold employers liable if
304 See McDonnellDouglas, 411 U.S. at 805.
305 Title VII defines private employers as those who employ 15 or more employees. See
42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994).
3 06 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1); see also, e.g., McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 801
("What is required by Congress is the removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers
to employment when the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial or
other impermissible classification.") (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,430-31
(1971)).
307 29 U.S.C. § 623 (1994). see also, e.g., Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469
U.S. 111, 120 (1985) (stating under the ADEA Congress "'broadly prohibit[ed] arbitrary
discrimination in the workplace based on age") (quoting Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 577
(1978)).
308 See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(8) (1994).
309 See 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a)(1) (1994).
310 See id. Congress explained that it enacted the 1991 Civil Rights Act because it was
apparent that new legislation was necessary to give individuals additional protection from
employment discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981(c)(2). It stated its purpose was to ensure that
the Supreme Court followed its lead in expanding the scope of civil rights statutes to provide
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plaintiffs can show that the employers were motivated by intentional
discrimination, each statute ensures that individuals at least have the opportunity
to prove such a claim. Underlying the prohibition of discrimination based on sex,
race, age, and disability is the belief that each individual should be able to work in
an environment free from discriminatory animus.31 1 The natural consequence of
an individual's right to work in a discrimination-free environment is the right for
an individual to hold her employer liable if it does not provide her with such an
environment.
The D.C. Circuit's interpretation and application of Hicks furthers the
principles set forth in antidiscrimination statutes. Permitting the use of
circumstantial evidence at the pretext stage allows plaintiffs to adequately prove
their discrimination claims based upon the evidence that is available to them.
Analyzing a plaintiff's burden of proof in the context of issues of credibility
protects the plaintiff's opportunity to present circumstantial evidence. Moreover,
it ensures that defendants will not be held liable unless proof of a discriminatory
animus is shown. That is, regardless of whether a plaintiff presents direct or
circumstantial evidence, she must show that the defendant's explanation is false
and that discrimination is the real reason. As a result, Aka v. Washington Hospital
Center ensures that the pretext standard set forth in Hicks can be applied
consistently with the full and fair opportunities guaranteed in each
antidiscrimination statute.
VI. CONCLUSION
A resolution to the debate over how a plaintiff survives summary judgment at
the pretext stage has been long overdue. But the D.C. Circuit's decision in Aka v.
Washington Hospital Center demonstrates that most circuit courts have
overlooked the fact that the debate did in fact end with Hicks. By interpreting
Hicks consistently with the Supreme Court's language, the D.C. Circuit shows
that a plaintiff has an opportunity to survive summary judgment at the pretext
stage, even if she does not have direct evidence. Moreover, the D.C. Circuit
demonstrates that the plaintiff's right to hold her employer liable for the
discrimination she encounters in the workplace can be balanced with the
employer's right not to be held liable unless it actually discriminated. Therefore,
them "adequate protection" from discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981(c)(3); see also, e.g.,
H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt. 2, at 1 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 694,694 (noting the
two purposes of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 are to respond to recent Supreme Court decisions
that affected individual civil rights protections and to strengthen existing protections and
remedies to victims of discrimination).
311 See, e.g., EEOC Enforcement Guidance on St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, EEOC
Compl. Man. (BNA) No. 186 at N:3363 n3 (Apr. 12, 1994) (taking the position that a "prima
facie case, coupled with a non-crediblejustification from the employer, is sufficient to support a
finding of discrimination").
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with the Aka analysis available to all courts, the debate over summary judgment at
the pretext stage should come to a halt More importantly, by applying the Aka
analysis, all courts can ensure that plaintiffs have a full and fair opportunity to
pursue their employment discrimination claims.
